

Problems in Abnormal Behaviour

PROBLEMS IN ABNORMAL BEHAVIOUR

BY NATHANIEL THORNTON

**GRAND HOTEL
NAINITAL**

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TO THE MEMORY OF
MY MOTHER

(July 31, 1889—August 25, 1943)

Sigmund Freud

You laboured with grim purpose to explain,
As though by chart or graph, the human mind;
Probing each dim recess, each hidden bane,
And each reflex of predetermined kind.
Impulse you found untractable and blind;
Else "sublimated" through imperious need.
The large, intrepid project you designed
Was one nor hate nor bias could impede.

Now have your words resolved into a creed
Where knowledge of the inward man is sought:
View proudly, then, the richness of the seed
You dropped into the soil of mortal thought.
But still the heart, intuitive and wise,
Transcends the scope of precept and surmise.

—NATHANIEL THORNTON

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CHAPTER I

Introductory

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*Know then thyself, presume not God to scan;
The proper study of Mankind is Man.*

—POPE

NO DOUBT AT SOME TIME OR OTHER WE have all reflected how easy it is to imagine that one knows everything. That I have reflected upon this subject, not once but many times, I have no wish to deny. Such a mental process—or should one call it a mental aberration?—as imagining that one knows everything is infinitely easier, to be sure, than mastering even the most elementary concepts we shall encounter in any branch of psychology. If the average individual were but half as wise as he perhaps conceives himself to be, then surely Solomon would have to look to his laurels. No former age, I fancy, has lacked its share of so-called “smart alecks”; and it is to be doubted, I hasten to add, whether our own age is any exception to the rule. We have been instructed that a fool is wiser in his own conceit than seven wise men.

Now there are many people, to be sure, who have managed to acquire a certain amount of theoretical and/or empirical knowledge. Let proper credit be accorded to them. Where, however, are we to look for those who have achieved that rich and ripe wis-

dom which is the sum total of spiritual, emotional, æsthetic, and intellectual experience? I cannot emphasize too strongly that the difference between knowledge and wisdom is no trivial or negligible one. It is doubtful whether anybody has more cogently acquainted us with this fact than the English poet Cowper has done in his great work, *The Task*. In this poem Cowper has said:

*Knowledge and wisdom, far from being one,
Have oft-times no connexion. Knowledge dwells
In heads replete with thoughts of other men;
Wisdom in minds attentive to their own.
Knowledge, a rude, unprofitable mass,
The mere materials with which wisdom builds,
Till smoothed and squared and fitted to its place,
Does but encumber what it seems to enrich.
Knowledge is proud that he has learned so much;
Wisdom is humble that he knows no more.*

Observe: "Wisdom is humble . . ." Have we not all noticed, perhaps even with a feeling of awe, that humility which characterizes those who are truly great? Have we not noticed also that "the empty vessel makes the greatest sound"? Tolerance, understanding, and open-mindedness are the fruits of wisdom. Prejudice and hatred spring from a soil polluted by ignorance, misapprehension, or that dangerous half-knowledge which, in the ultimate analysis, is

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perhaps worse by far than no knowledge at all. Let us recall Pope's words, for Pope was a wise man:

*A little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring.*

I like to think that anyone's use of this book will be a true indication of a desire on that person's part to master the fundamentals of Freudian and abnormal psychology. I like to think that the real spur is interest, not mere curiosity; that the individual wishes to learn, not merely to scoff. It is safe, at all events, to say that scoffing is but a self-protective mechanism which many a person has built up for himself in an effort to conceal or disguise his own ignorance.

Though countless adult individuals lack all scientific insight into the ideas and theories of such a man as Sigmund Freud, there is no knowing how many times these same individuals have seen and heard his name—a name which by now is practically a household term, not only in America, but also in every other civilized country on the face of the globe. For aught I know, they may even have heard Freud's adversaries refer to him by some such designation as "the high apostle of sex." But the fact remains that they have scarcely paused to weigh and consider the influence which Sigmund Freud's ideology has exerted upon our civilization, our system of thought, our very concept of life.

From time immemorial, nearly every man who has been able to contribute anything of permanent value to mankind has met with a certain amount of prejudice or direct opposition; at times, indeed, even with hatred or opprobrium. What of Socrates, for instance? What of such men as Darwin and Pasteur? Were they not all misunderstood, whether to greater or lesser degree, by their august contemporaries? Doubtless, then, it was inevitable that such a man as Sigmund Freud should not escape the fate of other original investigators. This, however, Sigmund Freud has in common with intrepid spirits like Socrates, Darwin, and Pasteur: that he has succeeded—in spite of prejudice and opposition, in spite of hatred and opprobrium—in leaving his own highly individualized imprint upon the tablets of human thought.

Like many another sturdy soul who, even in the face of censure, insult, and bitter prejudice, had clung with unwavering conviction to his own ideas and ideals (it is sometimes difficult to differentiate such entities), Freud was almost universally misunderstood at the beginning of his career. Even today, more than half a dozen years after his death, he is still apparently misunderstood and misinterpreted by many persons who lack the intellectual courage or agility to investigate for themselves the subtleties and complexities of his ideology. There are countless people, on the other hand, who perhaps too readily

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have accepted Freud's teachings as scientific and generally valid. They maintain that those who sneer at the master's findings do so because they are ignorant or prejudiced; or perhaps because they are not strong enough to face the truth as it is set forth by Freud. Whether an individual belong to the one category or to the other, he must needs admit that it is always easy enough to ignore or even condemn whatever exceeds the range of his own comprehension or fails to reinforce his own prejudices or preconceived notions.

I should like to relate a little incident which occurred about two years ago in a théâtre where I was attending a dramatic performance. Sitting next to me were a young man and a young woman. Each of them appeared, I should say, to be about twenty. During one of the intermissions there occurred between the young man and the young woman a conversation which I shall endeavour now to reproduce as accurately as my memory allows after this lapse of time:

YOUNG MAN: I've been reading Freud.

YOUNG WOMAN: Yes?

YOUNG MAN: Yes. There's a lot of meat in him.

YOUNG WOMAN: He writes a lot about sex, doesn't he?

YOUNG MAN: Well—yes . . .

YOUNG WOMAN: It's not too deep, is it? Do you think that I should read Freud?

YOUNG MAN: It might not be a bad idea.

As the curtain then began to go up again, I was not privileged to hear a continuance of this intensely amusing little exchange of sentiments. Now, looking back upon the experience, I quite honestly believe that hearing the young man and the young woman talk more about Freud would have yielded me at least as much enjoyment as the play seemed able to do.

I should like to add that those trivial remarks which I have just reproduced from memory—although in themselves they are, of course, purely insignificant—afford us a fairly reliable clue as to what the average American really knows about Sigmund Freud. Nor do I care at all whether the individual in question be twenty, or fifty, or seventy.

The study of this book is not intended to give the reader an expert's knowledge of Freudian and abnormal psychology; it will not prepare him to probe every dim recess of the unconscious mind or every phase or aspect of the neurosis; it will not enable him to become a competent lay-psychoanalyst. Now that I have stated so explicitly what is not to be expected, I hasten to add what the reader may reasonably hope to accomplish. He will learn at least the fundamental principles upon which the Freudian ideology is

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founded; he will assimilate something of the nature of neurosis, the nature of psychosis, and certain deflections or aberrations of the sexual instinct. It is my hope, moreover, that the use of this book will awaken within the reader an interest deep and lively enough to justify his continuing, whether formally or informally, his enquiry into the ideas of men like Sigmund Freud. True, a comprehensive study of such ideas might well entail a lifetime of effort and labour. I, for one, am inclined, however, to believe that the ultimate result would be worth all the time, all the effort, all the labour.

For the value which accrues to an individual from a knowledge of Freudian and abnormal psychology is scarcely to be overestimated. We are now in a position to state almost dogmatically that neurosis, psychosis, and other manifestations of a disturbance in the psychic mechanism do not, as a rule, spring up overnight like a mushroom growth. Frequently enough, they have their roots in the individual's very constitution; or else they are traceable to childhood experiences or to what we know as a "complex" or a "fixation." Following Freud, we employ the word "id" to designate that mass of instinctual drives or tendencies with which a person is born. In this connection, one may mention such psychological and psychobiological impulses as the sense of fear, the need for some form of self-assertion, strivings towards the relief of

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somatic tension, the will to self-preservation, feelings of thirst and hunger, and so on. Actually, as Freud has pointed out, we possess but a limited knowledge of the id, beyond the fact that it appears to be almost everything the ego is not. At any rate, the id is an unconscious part of the personality; that is to say, its functions are operative below the level of consciousness, and are not amenable to the specific laws of consciousness. The perfectly conscious part of the personality—i.e., that part which acts as a sort of mediator between the instincts of the id and the demands of external reality—we know as the “ego.” In other words, the ego is the individual’s conscious moral self; it is the instrument whereby he is equipped to deal with things outside himself—for example: his environment, his family and social relationships, his adaptation to objective reality, his ethical responsibilities, and so on. It is a specific function of the ego to effect as harmonious an agreement as possible between the id and the outside world. When an appreciable conflict occurs between the id and the ego, the result is liable to be in the nature of what we know as “neurosis”—i.e., a disturbance of the psychic.

Now we are all well acquainted with the functions and workings of the conscious mind. The complexities of the unconscious mind we are to explore, to some extent, as our study progresses. Perhaps I can best explain the nature of the unconscious by saying

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it is that part of one's personality wherein are concealed, or to which are transferred, those ideas, emotions, or impulses which, for one reason or another, the individual is not able to entertain consciously. Perhaps they are painful to him; perhaps they clash with the moral, ethical, religious, or æsthetic standards which he has set for himself. Whatever the reason may be, it is an undoubted fact that numerous persons manage for indefinite periods to keep certain desires or instincts somewhere below the level of actual awareness. I must emphasize here that such desires or instincts are not really conquered or completely uprooted. In reality they are simply, as we say, "repressed" or "suppressed." That, in spite of this fact, they continue to persist unconsciously, has been shown again and again by the application of hypnotic and psychoanalytical therapy. When eventually they are permitted to burst fully into consciousness, they may interfere to a greater or lesser extent with the functions of the conscious psychic mechanism.

At this point in my introduction, to obviate any possible misunderstanding, I may as well remark that though in the course of this work the orthodox Freudian point of view will be maintained to a large extent, and even emphasized in certain connections, it is the author's purpose also to give the reader some knowledge of abnormal psychology in general. Those who have not previously studied the subject at all will, I

am confident, find revealing, to say the least, some of the concepts to be presented to them in the ensuing chapters. From time to time, references will quite naturally be made to the Jungian and Adlerian systems of psychology; and when the time is ripe for an enquiry into deviations and aberrations of the sexual impulse, we shall have to take into account the contributions of such men as Richard von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902), who has been called the founder of modern sexual pathology; Havelock Ellis (1859-1939), whose monumental studies have done so much to enlighten the world at large about sexual matters; and Magnus Hirschfeld (1868-1935), whom Ellis himself has declared to be the principal authority on homosexuality and transvestitism. Freud himself was well acquainted with the writings of such men as these; in fact, he was enormously indebted to such men for much of what he himself knew about the irregular development of the sexual instinct.

Perhaps I may be allowed to make a few more remarks before I bring this introduction to a close. By its very nature this is a subject which one must approach, if not in a rigidly scientific way, at least in a way characterized by serious-mindedness, or perhaps a wholesome spirit of inquisitiveness, rather than by simple curiosity. Since we are dealing with the psychology of the abnormal, we may be compelled to discuss quite openly a number of matters which a class in religion

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or ethics, for instance, would scarcely need to mention at all. We may, in fact, as our study continues, find ourselves freely discussing a variety of topics which as yet, so far as I can ascertain, have not invaded the realm of polite social conversation. But unless we can refer in detail to the normal and so-called abnormal manifestations of the sexual urge, we shall, in a measure, defeat our own purpose. It is beyond my comprehension how anyone could set forth the concepts of a man like Sigmund Freud without laying very special emphasis upon his ideas about the sexual instinct. Could one lecture on Newton without mentioning the law of gravity; or on Darwin without drawing into consideration the theory of evolution; or on Einstein without speaking about relativity? To say that Freud attributes an overwhelming importance to the sexual instinct is to be guilty of no exaggeration whatsoever: it is, rather, to utter the plain, unvarnished truth.

The field of abnormal psychology is, in reality, so broad a stretch of territory that in gazing upon it one is impressed chiefly with a rather painful sense of one's own smallness. Again and again I have watched the puzzled, indeed almost incredulous, expressions of my pupils as I have endeavoured to explain to them some particularly erratic or fantastic departure from average behaviour. Not infrequently, in answer to those same puzzled, indeed almost incredulous, ex-

pressions of theirs, I have quoted to my pupils two marvellous lines from *Hamlet*:

*"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy."*

In the writing of this concise volume, I have had before my mind's eye constantly some fine words from the pen of an eminent sexual scientist, Iwan Bloch, whose name appears from time to time in the course of the work. Bloch has reminded us eloquently that the way of truth is paved with errors of one kind or another. The ultimate goal of science, he declares, is truth, and not a theory; though for the sake of a mere theory many people will go on clinging blindly, and indeed even obdurately, to error recognized as such. So far as such a thing was possible for him, Iwan Bloch endeavoured to deal with facts, not with mere theories. I trust it is no rank presumption on my part to feel that I have made every possible effort to follow his splendid example.

In the course of this work, we shall glance at some of the most intricate, most baffling forms of human behaviour. I hope we shall not fall into the common fallacy of permitting ourselves to lose sight of that relation between the normal and the so-called abnormal. The difference between the two is, after all, merely a matter of degree or intensity.

Abnormal behaviour we shall consider, however

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briefly, from several different points of view—chiefly, it is true, from the Freudian, but also from the criminal and the endocrinological. It is the author's personal conviction that whoever writes now upon the subject of human behaviour can ill afford to lose cognizance of the momentous advances which have been made in comparatively recent years in the scientific study of internal secretions as causal factors in the production of psychic and sexual disturbances. When the idea of this condensed work first entered my mind, I resolved immediately that it should be written to some extent from a *comparative* point of view, rather than from a rigidly circumscribed one belonging to some particular school of thought. This and nothing else has been my aim and purpose: to place in the hands of those who require it a concise work designed to serve the purposes of study and easy reference. I am of course not optimistic enough—or would *childish* be the right word?—to believe that I have achieved anything vaguely resembling completeness. On the contrary, I realize full well that I could easily have written a complete textbook upon any one of the principal subjects I deal with in the present volume.

In conclusion, I wish to express the hope that those for whom I have written this book may find it suitable for their purposes.

CHAPTER II

Psychic Functions and Psychological Types

*Seek now the self behind this wall of flesh:
Confess its frailties, and proclaim its worth:
Retrieve the courage to explore afresh
Those forces which have moulded it from birth . . .*

—NATHANIEL THORNTON

BEFORE WE PROCEED TO A CONSIDERATION OF other matters, let us give some attention to certain concepts which belong to normal as well as to abnormal psychology. I have always thought (and experience has confirmed this) that those who have first understood what we generally classify as the normal are for that reason in a better position to grasp phenomena associated with the abnormal. In this chapter I shall endeavour to acquaint the student with certain basic psychic functions, and also to give him some idea of the personality categories into which human beings fall.

Let the student be warned here that a perfectly exact and infallible classification of psychological types, for instance, is not in every case feasible. We must bear in mind that we are dealing with human beings, not with swine or cattle, or with inanimate objects. Sometimes the existence of purely individual differences will render it difficult enough for us to decide with certainty whether a particular person is this or that type. In the end we may find ourselves with little choice save to classify such a person ac-

cording to whether he is *preponderantly* this or that type. In other words, the standards by which we judge such things as character and temperament must remain flexible to a degree. To permit them to become merely static or rigid would be unfortunate, if not disastrous.

In the ensuing discussion, we shall rely chiefly upon the findings and pronouncements of C. G. Jung, whose elaborate system of psychology has occupied itself rather extensively with the very matters about to be considered. To whatever extent one may feel disposed to take issue with Jung as regards sundry points involved in his analytical psychology as a whole, surely no one can deny the enormous debt we owe to him for what he has taught us about the functions of the psyche, and for his scholarly and valuable accomplishments in the painstaking classification of psychological types.

What do we understand today by the word *psyche*? Precisely what meaning does it convey to the average intellect? To Jung the word quite obviously means more than does either "mind" or "soul" (*Seele*). To put the matter more precisely: Jung regards the word "psyche" as conveying the idea of the sum total of psychogenic processes, both those which are conscious and those which are unconscious.

From this we shall see that he invests the term with

such a meaning as the words "soul" and "mind" together might have.

For Jung the entire structure of the psychic system is a thing dynamically, not statically, constituted: he conceives it as being perpetually in dynamic motion. Moreover, Jung attributes to the psyche an independent status: it rests upon its very own foundation; it is amenable to its own laws, and is controlled and disciplined by them. The student of psychology should be made to realize that this concept is really much more recent than it may seem.

After Jung, we attribute to the psyche four distinct fundamental "functions" of which all persons are constitutionally capable. These functions are enumerated as:

1. Thinking
2. Feeling
3. Intuition
4. Sensation

To examine these in some detail will constitute our next task. Before we do so, however, it may be expedient to add at this point that Jung considers a psychological function to be a certain type of psychogenic activity which remains unaltered in the face of varying circumstances, and which remains independent of such contents as may happen to be present in it at any particular moment.

The function enumerated first is that of *thinking*. The individual in whom this function is conspicuously operative is one who relies upon intellectual processes—i.e., upon cognition—in arriving at conclusions, in evaluating psychic material, or in dealing with matters which penetrate his consciousness from day to day. If we describe any person as the thinking type, we imply that we are not so much concerned with what he thinks as we are with the fact that he does employ actual cognition for the purposes mentioned above. In view of the fact that this sort of individual works with values, judging them upon the basis of whether they are true or false, logical or illogical, we say that the function in question is a *rational* one; meaning that it rests upon an intellectual foundation rather than upon an emotional or perceptive one. The thinking type may be a statesman, a scientist, or an inventor—almost anybody, in fact, whose attitude, actions, and faculties are dominated largely by considerations of logical values. Jung has himself mentioned Darwin as an example of the extraverted thinking type, and the philosopher Kant as an example of the introverted thinking type. To me it seems that more striking examples could scarcely be imagined.

Feeling is likewise regarded as a rational function, because it too concerns itself primarily with values. Unlike thinking, however, feeling regards things

from the point of view of whether they leave a pleasing or disagreeable impression upon the psyche. Since the two yardsticks employed by these functions differ basically from each other, it is hardly conceivable that such functions as thinking and feeling could operate simultaneously to the same extent in a single individual. For this reason, the function which the individual has more firmly at his disposal, and which helps him to deal with life in general, is termed the *differentiated* or *superior* function. It is safe to conclude that in any single individual thinking always predominates over feeling, or feeling over thinking. Hence we are justified in speaking of the *mutually exclusive character* of these two psychic functions.

I believe it is not illogical to assume that the feeling type is at least fairly often encountered among persons who are creative in art—perhaps in music or poetry. The poet Keats, in my opinion—to mention just one example—could be classified with certainty as an introverted feeling type. As students of English literature will recall, a prime characteristic of his most delicately beautiful work is a tremendous luxuriance of emotion rather than anything suggestive of staggering intellectual power. One feels, in reading his poems, that he must have evaluated almost everything in life from the point of view of whether it was ugly or beautiful, graceful or grotesque, agreeable or disagreeable.

The next type to be mentioned is the intuitive, or the one in whom intuition has been developed to such an extent as to be actually employed by the individual in dealing with psychic material or contents. By intuition Jung himself understands "unconscious perception." The intuitive type is one who perceives things by intuition rather than by thinking or reasoning. Such a being is capable of bursts of divination originating entirely within himself rather than from any stimulus lying outside himself. The true intuitive type is, in my opinion, a being we encounter infrequently enough. If we accept Jung's definition of intuition as "unconscious perception," perhaps we shall not err in forming the conclusion that persons who take pains to convince us that they possess intuitive power, and who energetically insist that they "sense" things within themselves, are not genuinely intuitive but perhaps mildly hysterical. Or they may be persons with what Jung has himself termed a "neuropathic inheritance." I have in mind at the moment a somewhat typical example—a dramatic character who is firmly convinced that she is intuitive, but whose every so-called "hunch" turns out to be wrong. This pseudo-intuitive type is found more frequently among women than among men. What is commonly known as "feminine intuition" or a "mother's intuition" may, on the other hand, have a perfectly authentic connection with the intuitive function as it has been explained to us by Jung.

The fourth and final functional type is the one in whose psychic processes sensation has a significant or accentuated rôle. I am going to ask that no one permit himself to be misled by the word "sensation" as it is employed here to designate a particular psychological type; for actually the word, in this connection, does not necessarily imply that the character of an individual who falls into this category is marked any more by cheapness, coarseness, or sensuality, for instance, than might be the case with the thinking, the feeling, or the intuitive type. The human being in whom sensation is a well-developed function may be a thoroughly pleasant, jovial, social, good-humoured fellow; he might have a highly discriminating or selective sense of taste, accompanied perhaps by the ability to act as a connoisseur of foods and wines; his visual sense might be so sharp as to enable him to become a first-rate judge of paintings, works of sculpture, and the like.

Both intuition and sensation are regarded as "irrational" functions, for the reason that they work rather with perception than with conscious cognition. I have drawn attention already to the fact that thinking and feeling cannot both be differentiated or superior functions in the same human being. The same thing is true where intuition and sensation are concerned. If the one be differentiated, the other must be regarded as what we term the "inferior" function; and

for this reason it occupies a relatively subordinate position in the psychic system.

Perhaps the main difference between the intuitive type and the sensation type is that the former is concerned more with inward things; the latter, more with outward things. To express the matter in other words: sensation is motivated by what lies outside the individual's own psyche; intuition, by what lies within the individual's own psyche. To illustrate the different ways in which these two functions operate, let me take a striking example from Jolan Jacobi's excellent study, *The Psychology of Jung*:¹ "Before a beautiful, blooming spring landscape the sensation type will see and be aware of the flowers, the trees, the colour of the sky, etc., in full detail; the intuitive, however, will notice only the impression and colouring of the whole."

Were it possible for all four of these psychic functions to become appropriately differentiated in a single human being, we should then be in a position, Jung believes, to speak of the "complete man." Unfortunately, the very fact that the two "rational" functions exclude each other, as do also the two "irrational" ones, precludes automatically the existence of anything so ideal.

It is advisable for the student of psychology to bear

¹Jacobi, Jolan: *The Psychology of Jung*. Translated by K. W. Bach. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943.

in mind that all functional types are, as a rule, mixed rather than pure. If we take David Hume, the British philosopher, as a pure thinking type, then we shall have to concede that William James, for instance, was probably an intuitive thinking type. The average individual goes through life without ever clearly perceiving what type he himself is.

Although we could doubtless gain some idea of a man's psychological character by discovering the most highly differentiated function in him, this alone would be hardly sufficient to give us an appropriately profound insight into the workings of his psyche. In addition, we should have to ascertain his general psychological attitude, his habitual mode of reacting to matters, both internal and external, which penetrate his consciousness from day to day. We should have to ask ourselves the question: "Is he *introverted* or *extraverted*?" That the reader is thoroughly familiar with the careless, indiscriminate, everyday use of such terms as these, there can be no doubt. In order to create as little confusion as possible at this early stage, I shall endeavour to explain in the simplest language why it is that we designate one person as an "introvert," another as an "extravert."

First of all, Jung has long employed the terms *introversion* and *extraversion* for the express purpose of designating the two basic forms of human temperament. As a rule, either introversion or extraversion is

a constant rather than periodic mode of reaction in a particular individual's life, though at certain times the one mode of reaction may replace, or at least seem to replace, the other. Puberty, as Jolan Jacobi has pointed out in her concise treatment of Jung's psychological principles, is perhaps a more extraverted phase of life; whereas the period of involution—that is to say, the latter part of life—usually appears to be more introverted. But, generally speaking, everybody is fundamentally and primarily either an introvert or an extravert. If an individual is given to studying and analysing himself closely, and if most of his interests and pleasures are inextricably bound up with himself, we call that person an introvert. On the other hand, the man whose interests are largely concerned and occupied with external things—i.e., things outside himself—and who seldom if ever pauses to analyse his own feelings and reactions, is known as an extravert. Introverts, as a rule, are endowed with a reflective, brooding, perhaps even melancholy cast of mind; whereas extraverts are not infrequently persons who exhibit a cheerful, buoyant, rather aggressive sort of disposition. That, as between the two general-attitude types, the introvert is more sensitive, more easily wounded or discouraged, must be obvious. That the introvert is likewise, generally speaking, perhaps more gifted in art, music, literature, and the like, must be equally obvious. The

extravert, on the other hand, undoubtedly possesses a larger flair for things of a practical nature, to say nothing of a greater power for self-adaptation. Though he may lack the other's capacity for pure emotion, he may be endowed well enough in an intellectual way; and of the two, the extravert unquestionably enjoys the better chance for what is commonly and conventionally known as "happiness." Let the reader be explicitly warned that these last remarks of mine are mostly generalizations which, however, are not lacking in validity from the empirical point of view.

The danger which either introversion or extraversion may at any time incur is, of course, the danger of one-sidedness. The introvert who has not attained to a certain measure of self-adaptation may become excessively, even pathologically, introspective or subjective; and, as a direct result of this, he may be led to exaggerate his own problems and difficulties until his entire outlook upon life takes on an unhealthy colouring. The extravert, having always concentrated his interests largely upon external matters, may keep wandering farther and farther away from himself until it seems impossible for him to find his way back. It is a difficult matter, indeed, to decide which extreme is worse for the development and enrichment of the individual's personality.

Since any one of the four functional types may be

either introverted or extraverted, it automatically follows that there are, in all, according to Jung's typological system, eight possible psychological types. It may be interesting to observe here, in passing, that the Freudian school classifies personalities as (1) normal, (2) inhibited, (3) neurotic, and (4) criminal. In justice to Jung it should be added that it is his system rather than Freud's to which students of psychology have been in the habit of adhering.

CHAPTER III

Mental Mechanisms

*But we, brought forth and reared in hours
Of change, alarm, surprise—
What shelter to grow ripe is ours?
What leisure to grow wise?*

—MATTHEW ARNOLD

IN THIS CHAPTER WE SHALL PROCEED TO A CONSIDERATION of a subject which is scarcely less interesting than the one presented in the preceding chapter. The subject in question is that of mental mechanisms. Regardless of whether the student has ever had these explained to him from the point of view of their psychological significance, there is no doubt in my mind that he has met with them in the course of his everyday life. From time to time my own pupils have asked me this question: "Don't these mechanisms, as you call them, occur even among people who are generally well-balanced?" My answer: "Of course they do—naturally in a comparatively mild form. Only when they become completely disproportionate or exaggerated do they play any part in the production or development of any kind of serious psychic disturbance."

Now let us decide just what meaning the expression *mental mechanism* conveys to us. A mental mechanism is simply a device adopted by the individual for the purpose of keeping certain painful psychic contents outside the realm of consciousness. For this very

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reason it serves as a sort of palliative or protective agent for the ego. Thanks to what Sigmund Freud has taught us about the nature of unconscious psychic processes, we know now, beyond all doubt, that the individual who is forced to employ a mental mechanism is utterly unaware of the mechanism as such, and also of the extent to which it determines or influences his behaviour, his attitude, or his outlook. In evaluating Sigmund Freud's voluminous contributions to our knowledge of psychology, we must always take into account his repeated demonstrations of the existence of purely unconscious mental processes which operate for indefinite periods without ever bursting into consciousness. Such a *modus operandi* indicates beyond question that the psychic material which gives to such processes their specific character is such as would undoubtedly be painful or at least disagreeable to the ego if at any time it were raised to the level of awareness. In the ultimate reckoning, some may even be inclined to feel that his continual insistence upon such truths is really Sigmund Freud's most enduring contribution to psychology.

In Freudian psychology we speak often of a mechanism known as *repression*. Surely Freud's discovery of this mechanism remains to this day one of his most impressive, most momentous achievements. As we progress with our enquiry into Freudian ideas and theories, we may need to speak also of a mechanism,

similar to repression, which bears the name *suppression*. In ordinary speech and writing, these words have nearly the same fundamental meaning; that is to say, they are surely synonyms. What distinction, then, are we going to make between them? This is the distinction: repression is an unconscious process; suppression is a conscious one. If we repress an urge, a desire, or an instinct, we are not aware that we do so. In *suppression*, on the other hand, we may be perfectly, even painfully conscious of the necessity for keeping under control or restraint that particular urge, desire, or instinct. Some people, to give a specific instance, repress their sexual impulse; and then, not aware that they have done so, they may even boast that they are without sexual needs. An individual may decide, for religious, moral, or other reasons, to exert all his might towards the suppression of his sexual impulse. Thus we see that in suppression an effort which is not only conscious but grimly determined may sometimes be at work. It is only in keeping with Freud's own theory to add here that a repressed emotion or instinct usually manifests itself in some disguised form. This is a matter to which reference will be made again in the discussion of hysterical phenomena.

Just what does the term *complex*, introduced into psychology by C. G. Jung, really mean to the student or the layman who tosses the word about so carelessly

and so indiscriminately in everyday speech? Perhaps the very frequency with which the expression is employed is one reason why so many people have never bothered to find out for themselves what the word actually means in its strict psychological sense. We are informed, for instance, that this or that person suffers from an "inferiority complex" or from a "mother complex." It is a pity, to my way of thinking, that a word which still retains a fairly definite meaning for students of psychology should be thus abused in everyday speech.

It is C. G. Jung, as I have said already, to whom we are indebted for the introduction of the term *complex*; and I believe I am right in thinking that his definition of the complex is perhaps still the best one we have had. Complexes he regards as certain psychological components of the personality which have managed to get themselves split off from the personality as a whole, and which, being thus excluded from the realm of consciousness, function in arbitrary and autonomous fashion. At almost any moment, however, they are capable of influencing, furthering, or impeding conscious acts performed by the individual. It seems unnecessary to add that Freud is himself completely in agreement with this view of the purely unconscious nature of the complex. Stekel, on the other hand, embraces the notion that such a psychological device may very well operate in the sphere of consciousness.

The behaviour of a person who has a complex is naturally modified and/or regulated according to the specific nature of his own complex. A complex of any kind automatically causes the individual to think, feel, or behave in some particular manner. A person harbouring an inferiority complex, for instance, may be one who in his plastic or formative years was teased or ridiculed excessively about one thing or another; who was forever made to feel painfully conscious of his own inadequacies or shortcomings; who was never praised for anything meritorious which he accomplished. With the passage of time, such an individual has acquired a thoroughly exaggerated or even distorted notion of these inadequacies or shortcomings. Thus his present behaviour or mode of thought or feeling may be attributed to the formation of a complex.

A particular complex to which much significance has been attached by the Freudian school of thought is the one which has come to be known as the "Oedipus complex." Those who have studied Greek drama will recall the poetic tragedy by Sophocles entitled *Oedipus Rex*. In ignorance, the hero of this tragedy kills his father and marries his own mother. Though considerations of space prohibit my relating the story in detail, it can be readily seen, from what I have said, how apt and significant is the expression "Oedipus complex." By this term we now understand—broadly speaking—a sexually coloured attachment of the child

for one of the parents. That at a very early stage of the child's sexuality one of the parents should become the sexual object is tenable enough on general grounds. One contributory factor is the very closeness of the association between parent and child. A mother, for instance, who is of the doting kind, and who is much given to the habit of fondling and kissing, may unwitting promote the development of an Oedipus complex in the boy.

The Oedipus complex usually passes while the child is still at a relatively early stage of sexual development. If the complex is revived at the age of puberty, it may, as Freud himself assures us, engender disastrous results. As a rule, the Oedipus complex is replaced by the super-ego. Like the id, the super-ego belongs to the unconscious part of the personality. It acts autonomously as a kind of moral arbiter, or, as one writer has said, as "the critical faculty of the unconscious." It was Ferenczi, I believe, who aptly termed it "the unconscious conscience."

By *rationalization*, a term for which we are indebted to Ernest Jones, we understand a specious but fundamentally false mode of reasoning designed to explain in an acceptable fashion something which is really unacceptable to the ego. In rationalizing, a person may attribute his failures and shortcomings

to almost anything except whatever is the true cause. For instance, an individual unwilling to work for a living may endeavour to justify or condone such unwillingness on his part by maintaining that he is unable to obtain employment in the one particular field towards which he has a natural inclination. The real reason why he does not work is simply that he does not wish to. Rationalization can be so convincing at times that one not familiar with the true facts involved may give implicit credence to the professions of an individual employing this device. Fundamentally, of course, it is an unconscious mechanism.

By *compensation* one manages, I should say, to secure vicarious appeasement. A person without any knack whatsoever for mathematics may compensate for his deficiency in mathematics by going to extremes in order to excel in something else. As a rule, he possesses some purely natural talent, in any event, for the thing in which he determines to excel. Let us take another example. A person born with grave physical handicaps—for example, a Helen Keller—may compensate for those handicaps by means of a rigid and thoroughgoing development of mental ability, and ultimately, perhaps, by the accomplishing of socially useful and valuable work. A certain renowned psychologist makes no secret of the fact that compensative devices have been operative in his own life. Whether compensation is to become a shining

instrument for the individual's own good, or whether it is to degenerate into a weak and childish trick, will depend entirely upon the particular form it takes. It is almost always impossible to predict in advance just how anybody will endeavour to compensate for supposed or actual psychic inferiority, or for physical inferiority.

When there is a socially desirable response to an emotion or impulse which is unacceptable alike to society and to the person's own ego, we speak of a *reaction-formation*. Now I should like to illustrate precisely what I mean by this. A child harbouring an unconscious hatred towards his father may, in a time, say, of the latter's illness, become plainly oversolicitous as regards the father's condition. This anxiety on the child's part may well be out of all proportion to the gravity of the parent's illness. In this case the child's conscious response—i.e., the oversolicitude—is obviously acceptable to the ego, because it is desirable from the social point of view; whereas the feeling of hatred, though it has been repressed, still persists in the unconscious part of the child's personality.

The mechanism termed *symbolization* is, like the preceding one, a thoroughly unconscious process. It is also relatively infrequent: at all events, I personally have observed its presence in very few cases. Since, however, we do meet with it now and then, not only

in everyday life, but also in neurosis—i.e., compulsion or obsessional neurosis—I should like to explain briefly what it amounts to, and how it operates. By means of symbolization one may create a certain association of ideas without being aware of the reason why one does so. A woman, for instance, may choose a particular colour, or prefer in her home a particular style of furniture, because that colour or that style of furniture is associated in some way or other with some special experience in her life, or possibly some period. Unless it be specifically pointed out to her, she may be completely unable to establish the faintest connection between the colour and the experience: all she is sure of is that the colour appears to satisfy her æsthetic requirements.

It is no uncommon experience, I fancy, to have admired some person extravagantly—so extravagantly, in fact, that one has felt the urge to think, feel, and behave like that person; in other words, to imitate him in general. Surely the experience is a common enough one; especially among very young people whose characters and personalities are still in the process of formation. Such a device we designate in psychology as *identification*; for the admirer practically merges his own personality with that of the admired one. What we know as “hero worship” may, under certain circumstances, develop into a form of identification. In its milder forms, this mechanism is perhaps harm-

less enough; whereas in more pronounced cases it may lead eventually to a more or less radical disorganization of the individual's own personality. In their study entitled *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, Healy, Bronner, and Bowers,² have given us an excellent definition of the mechanism under consideration: "Identification is the unconscious moulding of a person's own ego after the fashion of one who has been taken as a model."

The person given to *projection* is one who attributes or imputes his own ideas or impulses to another person. The ideas or impulses are, of course, undesirable or unacceptable to the individual's own ego; hence he *externalizes* them, as we say, by associating them with somebody else. From such a procedure he apparently derives a certain measure of psychic satisfaction. A familiar example of projection is the blaming of other people for one's own mistakes or failures. The individual doing so is said to be *projecting* his mistakes or failures. Any number of persons must encounter this device day after day without at all realizing its true nature or import. Neither have they any notion that this same device, in a highly accentuated form, may play a significant part in one of the major forms of psychosis.

²Healy, W., Bronner, A. F., and Bowers, A. M.: *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1930.

Introjection bears some similarity to *identification*. Freud himself, as a matter of fact, has used interchangeably the terms *introjection* and *secondary identification*. In introjection the person incorporates into himself the likeness of some object as he himself imagines that object to be. A person who is depressed, let us say, about the loss of a loved one, may have an impulse to direct his feelings towards his own mental image of the one whom he loves. He may go so far, indeed, as to behave towards that image as though it were truly the loved one.

Rather more complicated than introjection is, I think, the mechanism Sigmund Freud has designated as *displacement*. This he has detected in cases, for example, of obsessional neurosis. In displacement we can observe the transference of emotions from the ideas with which they were originally associated to ideas of a different sort. By this means, the individual spares himself the painful consciousness of the connection between his emotions and the original ideas. Now I should like to clarify, by offering an actual example, the rather special processes which operate here. Let us assume that someone has developed an uncontrollable mania for washing his hands. From the Freudian point of view, what may this indicate? It may very well indicate that as a child this same individual had an equally uncontrollable mania for handling unclean objects or harbouring unclean

thoughts against which his ego was destined to rebel. Consequently, this act he now feels himself constrained to perform—i.e., the excessive washing of his hands—may in reality be a kind of unconscious penitence. Though he may realize how preposterous it is for him to be dominated by this mania, he is nevertheless unable to renounce it. Were he analysed, however, he might be able to see for himself the logical connection between the original idea and its ultimate displacement through the instrumentality of this compulsive act.

The mechanism known as *narcissism* takes its name, of course, from a famous Greek legend with which almost everybody is familiar. This term was first employed in scientific literature by Paul Näcke, a German scholar, physician, and criminologist, to indicate love of oneself. Those who possess the narcissistic temperament are wont to lavish upon themselves the devotion and caresses which otherwise would be lavished upon other people. Narcissism may be combined with masturbatory activities or some other means of sexual self-gratification (or "auto-erotism," as Havelock Ellis so felicitously puts it); or it may take the simple form of what one writer has termed "æsthetic Platonism." Those in whom it takes the latter form may deck themselves in striking attire just to feast their own eyes, without being seen by other persons; or they may stand in front of a mirror

admiring themselves. Sometimes they may derive pleasure from kissing themselves in a mirror. Krafft-Ebing has reported the case of a narcissistic man who practised masturbation while he gazed at himself in a looking-glass. Should this narcissistic temperament become deeply rooted, it may continue even throughout the individual's life. Regarded from the point of view of its possible causation, narcissism gives the impression that it may well be a continuance of the auto-erotic phase of the child's development.

What do we mean by *fixation*? First it must be made perfectly clear that sexuality in the child extends through various stages before the child attains to sexual maturity. Associated with this sexual development are a number of partial or incomplete impulses which after puberty—provided the child's development in this respect has been average—merge into the sexual instinct as a whole, thus creating a sort of integrated and harmonious synthesis. Sometimes, however, one of these component impulses may become disproportionately accentuated or exaggerated, and for this reason it may develop independently instead of finding its own niche in the general scheme. When such a thing as this occurs, we are justified in assuming the existence of a *fixation*. Freud believes that certain sexual perversions which are to be discussed in another chapter of this book indicate that fixations upon component sexual impulses have taken

place. Very common today is the phrase "mother fixation." A young woman suffering from this species of fixation may discover, after reaching maturity, that she is still as closely bound to her mother as she was in her earlier years. Because of this fixation, she may even find it impossible to leave her mother for the sake of marrying and establishing a home of her own.

Regression means, in simple language, reverting to some earlier level of one's mental or emotional development. This is likely to occur with some frequency among certain excessively introverted persons who find it impossible to adjust themselves to the increasing demands of life. They take refuge, consequently, in *regressing* to some stage of their development at which such demands were neither so large nor so stringent. Regression may produce a mode of behaviour which, to all intents and purposes, is equivalent to that of a child.

By *dissociation* we understand the separation of certain components of the personality from the personality as a whole. The components separated from the rest of the personality may even seem to function quite independently, as though they belonged to the psyche of another individual. The result, obviously, is a certain splitting of the personality. Dissociation is a mechanism we detect frequently in schizophrenia, and also in such hysterical concomitants as somnambulism, fugues, amnesia, and automatic writing.

Like dissociation, *conversion* also occurs in cases of hysteria. Owing to certain ill-defined processes which operate in the psychic make-up of the hysterical person, a part of the body becomes affected, just as though physiological factors rather than psychological ones were at work. Thus a mental conflict comes to be expressed by means of a somatic complaint or difficulty. The word *conversion* does not occur very often in Freudian terminology except in the common phrase *conversion hysteria*.

With this brief description of the phenomena involved in conversion, I have set forth the principal aspects of a rather large number of mental mechanisms. It is my hope that in describing these as clearly as I know how I have not only quickened interest but also cleared the way, at least in some small measure, for an understanding of the more complex forms of abnormal behaviour, the more complex responses and reactions, which are to be considered in the following chapters. I hope also that what I have written in the present chapter has served the purpose of making clear how fragile is that line of demarcation which separates the normal from the neurotic. Even in an apparently well-balanced life one is likely to discover, in one direction or another, a certain amount of excess or disproportion. It is only when this excess or disproportion attains to a certain ill-defined point that we may find ourselves faced with the danger of neurosis.

CHAPTER IV

The Psychopathology of Everyday Life

*The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves . . .*

—SHAKESPEARE

I
IN ORDER THAT, AT THE PROPER TIME, WE MAY find ourselves in possession of an appropriate background for the understanding of more serious aspects of abnormal behaviour, and in order that in the meantime we may not lose cognizance of how fragile, after all, is that borderline between the normal and the pathological, I wish to deal in this chapter with what, thanks to Sigmund Freud, we have come to know as the psychopathology of everyday life. Freud's own work on this subject is replete with value and vital interest; and I recommend it without hesitation or reservation to anybody who would like to pursue or investigate the subject at greater length or in more copious detail than is possible within the limits of a single chapter in a volume such as this. So far as I am aware, to this day Sigmund Freud remains the only great psychologist of any age or nation who has accorded such comprehensive attention to the various matters embraced under the general heading of the psychopathology of everyday life.

In the present chapter I shall be compelled, by the very nature of this book, to present the psychopathol-

ogy of everyday life in concise rather than detailed fashion. I shall endeavour, even so, to make as lucid as possible a subject which students of psychology can hardly have failed to find entirely fascinating.

Before I proceed further, let us first decide exactly what meaning the phrase "psychopathology of everyday life" has for us. Perhaps there are those who will wince a little at the use of such a word as "psychopathology" in connection with certain apparently innocent and insignificant acts of everyday life. Perhaps they may deem it odd that Freud should have seen fit to attribute to these acts the slightest psychopathological significance. Such thoughts seem, at any rate, to be those which occur to most people—my own pupils included—when the subject is broached to them. If, however, the reader will bear with me patiently, he will doubtless comprehend why Freud should have been willing to devote a detailed work to the presentation of his own views on this same subject.

In the psychopathology of everyday life, as I have pointed out again and again in my lectures to my own pupils, we have to do simply with a host of *seemingly* little things which we do over and over in our daily lives without pausing to analyse them, or even to take into account whatever fundamental significance they may bear. I have in mind, specifically, such things as the forgetting of names, various errors in reading

and writing, actions not properly executed, and certain memories which are even too clear—so clear, in fact, that one is justified in suspecting they are unconsciously intended to conceal some fact or circumstance which the individual really prefers not to remember at all.

Now let us consider the forgetting of names—a process which surely is common enough amongst us. It may be that some such thought as the following will occur to the student: “The forgetting of names? Why, everybody forgets names at times; it’s quite a usual thing for the majority of human beings. Some people are blessed with marvellous memories; others are not. The fact that one individual remembers what another forgets, simply shows that the former has a superior memory.”

Of course the power of memory functions more efficiently in some human beings than it does in others. To deny so obvious a fact would be preposterous. I know one person who has memorized, without any considerable conscious effort, literally hundreds of lines of poetry; I know also people who have not been able, for all their efforts, to commit even a single fairly long poem to memory. Be that as it may, I must point out that the forgetting of names may be caused, not by a simple lapse of memory, but rather by an *unconscious* reluctance to remember those names. If we analyse closely and carefully a case of

this kind, we shall perceive that the individual who fails to remember a particular name may simply react against that name because of something it suggests to him, or something with which the name happens to be associated in the individual's own mind.

The following is an illuminating and instructive case which originally was reported by Ferenczi, and which has been quoted by Freud¹ in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*:

"A lady who heard something about psychoanalysis could not remember the name of the psychiatrist, Young (Jung).

"Instead the following names occurred to her: Kl. (a name)—Wilde—Nietzsche—Hauptmann.

"I did not tell her the name and requested her to repeat her free associations to every thought.

"To Kl. she at once thought of Mrs. Kl., that she was an embellished and affected person who looked very well for her age. 'She does not age.' As a general and principal conception of Wilde and Nietzsche, she gave the association 'mental disease.' She continued: 'I cannot bear Wilde and Nietzsche. I do not understand them. I hear that they were both homosexual. Wilde has occupied himself with *young* people' (although she uttered in this sentence the correct name, she still could not remember it).

¹Freud, Sigmund: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*. Translated by A. A. Brill. New York: Random House, 1938.

"To Hauptmann she associated the words *half* and *youth*, and only after I called her attention to the word *youth* did she become aware that she was looking for the name Young (Jung)."

Here is Freud's own shrewd analysis of this case: "It is clear that this lady, who had lost her husband at the age of thirty-nine, and had no prospect as to marrying a second time, had cause enough to avoid reminiscences recalling youth or old age. The remarkable thing is that the concealing thoughts of the desired name came to the surface as simple associations of content without any sound-associations."

The foregoing I have selected for quotation, not merely because of its intrinsic interest, but also because of an experience I myself had some time ago in connection with C. G. Jung's name. I had just finished a letter of some length to an acquaintance of mine whose name is Young. At the time I wrote the letter I was rather exasperated because of a promise he had made to me but had failed to keep. About fifteen minutes later I had occasion to write out the names of some people who originally had been very active in the development of psychoanalytical thought. The following are the names I wrote in this list:

1. Freud
2. Adler
3. Young

Obviously I should have written "Jung," not "Young." Why, then, did I actually write my friend's name instead of Jung's? True, the two names sound almost exactly alike; and many a person might feel disposed to account for my lapse in terms of this striking similarity of sound. We must bear in mind, however, that I had never previously written Jung's name incorrectly, and that I have not written it incorrectly a single time since that occurrence. We must bear in mind also that I had a special reason for harbouring an unconscious preoccupation with the name Young: I was annoyed because my friend had failed to keep the promise he had made to me. To my way of thinking, the fact that the two names sound almost exactly alike does in no wise provide an adequate explanation of why I wrote the one name rather than the other. Surely I had not forgotten Jung's name: I simply substituted my friend's for his.

A. A. Brill has given us a very interesting example of the *concealing memory*; i.e., a memory designed to turn attention away from some fact or circumstance which is painful, or at least disagreeable, to the individual. A patient of Brill's maintained that his memory extended back even to the time of his baptism, though he had been baptized in the Christian Church at a very early age. Astonished that one's memory could go back so far, Brill suggested to the young man that perhaps this memory served to conceal

something which he preferred not to remember. The patient, nevertheless, went on to give a host of picturesque details concerning his baptism. Analysis ultimately disclosed that though the young man was himself a perfectly good Christian, one of his grandfathers had been a Jew. This young man's German name had often been mistaken for a Jewish one; because of his name, he had once been turned away from some school or society which admitted only Gentiles. It now becomes obvious to us that the concealing memory which the young man cherished, and to which he had clung so tenaciously, was in reality a species of protective measure against his being taken for a Jew. One often enough observes such memories in one's everyday life. The example I have chosen happens, however, to be a particularly illuminating one. Instead of offering additional instances, I shall add simply that where concealing memories are concerned, the *modus operandi* is likely to remain basically the same, though of course each such memory may exhibit special features of its own.

Mistakes in speech, as well as those in reading and writing, must likewise be brought into consideration. If one discovers that he has made a mistake in speech, or in reading or writing, it is worth while to pause for a moment to ask oneself what possible significance may attach to the incorrect word which has been spoken or written. I hesitate not at all to say that in

most cases, if one goes deeply enough into the matter, he will discover that the error is not purely the result of momentary absence of mind. I always find it a stimulating experience to analyse my own mistakes so far as I can; to make every effort to trace them to their real sources.

Occasionally a slip of the tongue, or the use of an incorrect word, seems to possess what suspiciously resembles a sort of prognosticatory significance. In other words, the slip, innocent though it may appear on the surface, seems actually to foretell something yet to come. The following is an instance, reported by Freud himself,¹ in which a young woman was guilty of a neologism which obviously bore some genuine significance regarding the course of her future life:

"Miss X. spoke very warmly of Mr. Y., which was rather strange, as before this, she had always expressed her indifference, not to say contempt, for him. On being asked about this sudden change of heart, she said: 'I really never had anything against him; he was always nice to me, but I never gave him the chance to cultivate my acquaintance.'"

The young woman, however, according to Freud, actually said "cuptivate," not "cultivate."

"This neologism," remarks Freud in his analysis,

¹Freud, Sigmund: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*. Translated by A. A. Brill. New York: Random House, 1938.

“was a contamination of *cultivate* and *captive*, and foretold the coming betrothal.”

Maeder, of the Zurich school, relates the story of a lady who had forgotten to try on her wedding dress the day before her marriage, thus causing the dress-maker a certain amount of disappointment. Not until a late hour of the evening did this lady remember that she had intended to try on the dress. Hence one should perhaps not be too much surprised to learn that the lady's marriage lasted but a short time. Freud himself has known of women who lost their wedding rings while they were on their honeymoons, so that his surprise was but slight when he subsequently learned that their marriages had turned out to be unhappy. And now let us take a particularly striking example of the same general kind. It is said that a renowned German chemist failed to be married because he forgot the hour at which the ceremony was to be performed. Instead of going to the church, he went to his laboratory. Need we marvel at the knowledge that this man remained a bachelor for the rest of his life?

The next instance, involving myself, shows very clearly how the thought of some annoying or embarrassing experience can remain in one's mind, even though at the moment one may be without the faintest conscious recollection of it. Some months ago, while I was temporarily looking after the affairs of

another, I found myself much concerned about the payment of a printing bill. Shortly after my arrival at my friend's place on a certain morning, an employee of the printing concern delivered the letter-heads. I said to him: "My friend forgot to leave the cheque with me; he'll send it to you in a day or two, after he returns to the city." The reply was: "I'm sorry—I have orders not to leave the goods here unless I get the money." At the moment I also lacked any access to cash; so I had no choice but to let the boy take the printed matter away with him. Later in the day, as I was jotting down the gist of a telephone message which had been left for my friend, I wrote the word *printing* where some other word quite obviously belonged, although I can no longer recall that other word. In view of the foregoing, it is all too plain that the thought of such an embarrassing experience still persisted in my unconscious mind as I wrote out the message for my friend.

Of fairly frequent occurrence in one's everyday life is forgetting to do a thing one has consciously intended to do. In this connection, I should like to relate an incident which occurred in my own experience just a few months ago. I was visiting on that occasion in the home of an acquaintance whom I had known for only a short time. The mother, a most amiable old lady in her middle seventies, spoke en-

thusiastically about an article she had read in one of the popular magazines. The character of the article was such as to lead her to believe that an instructor in abnormal psychology might be very much interested in reading it. To be polite, I agreed with the old lady, though in reality I was but faintly interested in the article. She then fetched the magazine, saying I might keep it if I wished, as she herself had finished reading the contents. I laid the magazine aside, meaning to take it home with me. When, some hours later, I returned to my own place, I discovered that I had left the magazine behind. Now it is doubtful in the extreme—for I have a good memory—whether I should have failed to take that magazine home with me if the article had really been of vital interest to me. How often does one omit to do a thing one genuinely desires to do?

In order to illustrate further what we mean by actions which are not performed in accordance with the individual's conscious intent, I should like to take a more unusual example from Freud's *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*:¹

"At a certain time twice a day for six years, I was accustomed to wait for admission before a door in the second story of the same house; and during this

¹Freud, Sigmund: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*. Translated by A. A. Brill. New York: Random House, 1938.

long period of time, it happened twice (within a short interval) that I climbed a story higher. On the first of these occasions, I was in an ambitious day-dream, which allowed me to 'mount always higher and higher.' In fact, at that time, I heard the door in question open as I put my foot on the first step of the third flight. On the other occasion, I again went too far, 'engrossed in thought.' As soon as I became aware of it, I turned back and sought to snatch the dominating phantasy; I found that I was irritated over a criticism of my works, in which the reproach was that I 'always went too far,' which I replaced by the less respectful expression, 'climbed too high.' "

From the few examples quoted thus far in the present chapter, we are bound to conclude—that is, if our minds are open, and free from prejudice—that one is scarcely to explain these little slips and mistakes of everyday life simply as accidents resulting from preoccupation or momentary abstraction. For in each single case we have been able to observe that the slip or error has exhibited a direct and definite relation to certain facts or circumstances of the particular individual's life. Even when man's conscious apparatus is willing to stoop to deception, the unconscious remains truthful and honest. Freud has reported the case of a professor of anatomy who, having arrived at the end of his lecture, enquired whether his pupils had understood it. Without exception, his pupils

answered in the affirmative. The professor then went on to say:¹ "I can hardly believe that that is so, since persons who can thoroughly understand the nasal cavities can be counted, even in a city of millions, on *one finger* . . . I mean, on the fingers of one hand." By way of clarification Freud observes: "The abbreviated sentence has its own meaning: it says that there is only one person who understands the subject."

The psychopathology of everyday life may well include, in addition to the various little slips and lapses already mentioned, some consideration of an error which is fairly common even among those who enjoy very considerable skill in the use of the typewriter. The pedagogy of typewriting describes such an error as an "error of anticipation." I should like to illustrate what I mean. A person intends to type the word *ambitious*. His object, of course, is to strike the letters in the correct sequence. Before he strikes the letter *a*, however, his finger falls upon the *b* or the *m*. And it must be borne in mind that on a standard keyboard neither the *b* nor the *m* is near to the *a*. Obviously such an error is the result of a momentarily impaired coördination between mind and muscle.

From what has been set forth in this chapter, it will

¹Freud, Sigmund: *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*. Translated by Joan Riviere. New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1920.

be seen that a discrepancy between intention and performance is often to be explained, not as a mere accident, but rather as a striving of the unconscious mechanism to assert its own claims or demands, and not to be subordinated completely to mandates issuing from the conscious psyche.

CHAPTER V

The Development of Sexual impulse

*But O alas, so long, so far
Our bodies why do we forbear?
They are ours, though they are not we. We are
The intelligences, they the spheres.
We owe them thanks, because they thus
Did us to us at first convey,
Yielded their forces, sense, to us,
Nor are dross to us, but allay.*

—DONNE

W

E HAVE NOW REACHED THAT STAGE OF our study at which we shall devote our attention to various theories of the sexual impulse, including the famous Freudian ones which have created so much discussion, both favourable and adverse. Remembering Freud's own well-known if not infallible dictum that neurosis is not possible in a life which is properly regulated from the sexual point of view, I prefer to deal with the subject of sexuality before proceeding, in a subsequent chapter, to consider the numerous aspects and manifestations of neurosis. By so doing I shall render it easier, I believe, for the connection between neurosis and sexuality to be grasped. At all events, a good knowledge of the sexual instinct is desirable, if not necessary, purely for its own sake.

Before going one step farther, I should like to explain here and now that Freud himself has almost always employed in a very broad sense such words as "sex," "sexual," and "sexuality." In their work, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, Healy,

Bronner, and Bowers¹ remark: "He [Freud] feels justified from the scientific point of view of his researches, he says, in viewing as 'sexual,' or 'love,' or 'libido,' or 'Eros,' not only desires for sexual union but much else." I am inclined, indeed, to believe that much of the confusion which still exists where Freud's theories of sex are concerned can be attributed, whether in greater or in lesser measure, to the very broad sense in which he has habitually employed such words as these in his writings. Unless, however, we are perfectly aware of the significance he attaches to such terms, we shall find nearly incomprehensible, not to say fantastic, his views on various sexual problems.

Next we must familiarize ourselves with the connotation of the term *libido*, by which is roughly understood sexual hunger or sexual appetite. I wish to add, however, that the meaning which Freud frequently attaches to this word is rather less circumscribed. To Freud, *libido* often enough conveys the idea of that dynamic energy with which those various impulses and instincts are charged which can be comprised under the word "love." We need to understand, also, what Freud means when he speaks of the *sexual object* and the *sexual aim*. The sexual object

¹Healy, W., Bronner, A. F., and Bowers, A. M.: *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1930.

is the individual from whom sexual attraction issues; the sexual aim is the mode of gratification towards which the urge is directed.

Until the advent of Sigmund Freud, it was more generally assumed, alike by layman and by practitioner, that until the attainment of puberty the child really had no sexual life. Such a concept as the existence of an "infantile sexuality" would have been, perhaps, not only untenable but unthinkable. Krafft-Ebing¹ had written in his *Psychopathia Sexualis*: "The sexual instinct and desire, save for indistinct feelings and impulses, remain latent until the period of development of the sexual organs. The child is sexually neuter; and though, during this latent period—when sexuality has not yet risen into clear consciousness, is but virtually present, and unconnected with powerful organic sensations—abnormally early excitation of the genitals may occur, either spontaneously or as a result of external influence, and find satisfaction in masturbation; yet, notwithstanding this, the *psychical* relation to persons of the opposite sex is still absolutely wanting, and the sexual acts during this period exhibit more or less a reflex spinal character."

As a result of his painstaking observations and investigations, Freud long ago came to the conclusion

¹Krafft-Ebing, Richard von: *Psychopathia Sexualis*. Authorized translation from the Twelfth German Edition. New York: Pioneer Publications, Inc., 1939.

that though the sexual impulse as an integrated entity does not begin to function in the child until the thirteenth or fourteenth year, even the very young child of either sex evinces certain so-called pleasure strivings which appear to exhibit a sexual colouring. To Freud, it must be remembered, sexual satisfaction means "the relief of somatic irritability." That Freud's early discoveries in the domain of infantile sexuality were revolutionary and epoch-making has scarcely been questioned by any of his more ardent disciples; although it is true that Krafft-Ebing had reported cases of masturbation in children of four or five years.

According to Freud's theory, infantile sexuality has its origin at birth and continues until about the age of five. It seems to Freud that the infant, after sucking milk from its mother's breast, shows a satisfaction similar to that which belongs to an individual who has completed the sexual act and thus feels utterly satisfied. Surely such an analogy strikes one as being not altogether far-fetched; for in each case we can observe relief from desire and tension, to say nothing of a general sense of somatic and psychic well-being. Nor should we assume that such sucking on the infant's part is motivated exclusively by a desire for nourishment, because an infant may be known to seek its mother's breast at a time when no nourishment is actually required.

Among other infantile activities which strike Freud as having a sexual tinge, thumbsucking stands out. He has not hesitated, in fact, to attach very considerable importance to this practice. Where thumbsucking is concerned he has noticed, moreover, a definite desire for repetition; and this desire, in his view, gives to thumbsucking a heightened sexual significance.

A fairly large part of the curiosity evinced by young children seems to have a rather well-defined sexual content. Like Freud, we have all observed how children contrive to catch glimpses of other children's sexual organs; or perhaps of their parents' sexual organs. According to Freud, the child who chances to witness the sexual act invariably attributes to it a sort of sadistic character; that is to say, he regards it, in his own childish way, as an attempt on the man's part to overpower the woman. Freud continues his discussion of sexual curiosity in the child by drawing attention to the child's attitude towards the male organ of procreation. He says in this connection that in later years of childhood the youngster in all likelihood surmises that the male organ of the man is not without a role in the functions of procreation of children, but still cannot attribute to this portion of the anatomy any vital activity save that involved in the act of urination.

We can detect also in the child, apart from its curiosity about sexual matters, a certain propensity

for stroking and fondling objects. Children may stroke and fondle either parts of their own bodies—for instance, the ear-lobes—or parts of other people's bodies. The special pleasure children appear to derive from such a procedure must be palpable to even the most casual observer. At this point I must repeat, in the interest of absolute clarity, that whilst we cannot dogmatically maintain that such pleasure-strivings as these are definitely sexual in nature, they do betray, at least in a large number of instances, an affinity with certain manifestations which are later to exhibit an unmistakably sexual character. For the sake of honesty, one should admit that Freud's theories of infantile sexuality have been challenged in authoritative quarters, and that they are still open, perhaps, to some question. Magnus Hirschfeld, one of the most eminent sexual scientists, has expressed somewhere the opinion that it is perhaps preferable to leave unsettled the matter of whether this so-called infantile sexuality is a genuine sexuality at all. Hirschfeld's own vast experience in the province of sexual science has led him to question whether the erogenous zones or component impulses deserve to be regarded as phenomena which possess a primitively sexual colouring. According to him, the gratification which children appear to derive from certain pleasure-strivings or from certain vital functions—for example, anal ones—is not to be dogmatically considered as being equivalent to the

sort of satisfaction demanded by an authentic sexual libido. It may be pointed out in this place that C. G. Jung also appears to have found Freud's concept of sexuality a little too vague and pliable, since Freud so extends the meaning of the word "sexuality" as to make it include almost anything.

Following Freud, we designate certain parts of the human body as "erogenous zones." We thus designate them because, owing to their special sensitivity, sexual excitation can occur most easily in these particular parts. In the very early sexual life of the child, the mouth and the anus appear to be the erogenous zones to which Freud and his followers are wont to attribute the largest significance. The Freudians believe that the fondness which so many children have for sucking their thumbs argues the importance of the lip-zone. It is assumed that children who fail to suck their fingers during the early periods of their development are those in whom the sensitivity of the lip-zone is not "organically reinforced." Children who exhibit an organically reinforced sensitivity of the lip-zone are likely, in Freud's view, to become heavy smokers or drinkers in later life; or to become addicted to what he himself has termed "perverted kissing."

When we muse upon the strange, intense fascination which the act of defecation holds for so many children, we can hardly do otherwise than agree

with Freud that the anus is indeed a prime erogenous zone during the term of infantile sexuality. He has little doubt that a large number of children experience a sexually accentuated pleasure in the discharging of their fæces. Some children, he has discovered, will hold back their stool until, by a process of gradual accumulation, it creates certain decided muscular contractions, with the result that a pleasurable sensation is likely to occur through stimulation of the mucous membrane of the anus.

From the age of five until the onset of puberty, the child goes through what Freud has designated as the "period of sexual latency." The child is now more self-conscious; he is more inhibited; he is more careful about his personal habits and his appearance. Gradually the impulses of the id, as Freud would say, are made to feel the inhibitory forces of the ego. Moreover, the child is being educated; and in general he is beginning to feel some vague sense of duty and responsibility.

Finally, at about the age of fourteen, or slightly earlier—though this is apt to vary according to conditions of one kind or another—a vital awakening occurs. The primacy of the sexual organs over the other erogenous zones becomes firmly established, and the child grows conscious of the enormous capacity for physical pleasure which he holds in his own

body. In a word, the boy or the girl has reached puberty.

The age of puberty is momentous, indeed, from the somatic as well as from the psychic point of view. In addition to what we call genital primacy, the boy or girl acquires *secondary*, *tertiary*, and *quaternary sexual differences*. By secondary differences we mean the breasts in the female, and the greater width of the bony pelvis; and the lack of these in the male. By tertiary differences we mean growth of hair, distribution of fatty tissue, different development of bones and muscle, and differences of voice. By quaternary differences we understand certain mental characteristics common to the one sex or to the other.

But the arrival of puberty is by no means always so simple a matter as the foregoing remarks might lead one to suppose. Indeed, the age of puberty may be complicated by any of various factors or circumstances. It may, for instance, be an age at which the boy or girl is apt to suffer from sexual disturbances or to feel the weight of conflicting mental attitudes. Sometimes the Oedipus complex is revived at puberty. This age, moreover, is one at which the child may feel moody and unhappy without any apparent reason, or else may develop some kind of religious mania. Puberty is sometimes dangerous for the girl because of its possible connection with the formation of hysterical symptoms. For the boy or the girl,

it may be associated with the onset of dementia præcox.

During the period that immediately follows puberty, the child may be sexually normal, he may be attracted exclusively to persons of the same sex, or he may be indiscriminately bisexual. While he is still at this stage of his development, it is unwise to attempt to say positively whether his sexual impulse will be moulded ultimately in a heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual direction. Psychologists such as Freud and Havelock Ellis believe that at this age the boy or girl is chiefly homosexual, and that this accounts for the so-called "crushes" which girls develop for their female teachers, and boys for their male teachers. Max Dessoir, on the other hand, maintains that after reaching puberty the child embarks upon undifferentiated sexual stages. By this concept we are to understand that at such an age the child may be indiscriminately attracted to both sexes without, however, being a true psychic bisexual. This view of Dessoir's I am inclined to favour above the one held by Freud and Ellis, for the reason that where love is concerned the adolescent's spiritual and intellectual processes are still not developed highly enough for us to judge with anything approaching certainty how capable he is of forming a deep-rooted and really lasting attachment for a person of one sex or the other.

If, after a certain time, the child shows a marked predilection for the opposite sex, we say that he is *heterosexual*; if he is attracted exclusively to the same sex, we describe him as *homosexual*; if he evinces a leaning towards both sexes, we consider that he is *bisexual*.

About the question of masturbation I have thus far said nothing, though surely it is one of the most important sexual activities in the earlier life of the male or female. Of all the various aspects of sexuality, this is the one, I venture to say, about which our views have changed most in comparatively recent years. At one time it was held that the effects of this practice were equally prejudicial to mind and body; some neurologists in England and America spoke even of a "masturbatory insanity." The concept of such a species of insanity is now, of course, no longer at all tenable; and indeed the whole view of masturbation has been subject to rather drastic revision. It is a little disheartening, one must admit, that such a man as Richard von Krafft-Ebing, even although he merely scorned the idea of a masturbatory insanity, should yet have ascribed such grave results to the habit. Today, thanks to more recent investigations, we are in a position to state positively that this practice, unless carried to excess, has no purely somatic results which are serious; and that unless it be accompanied by a decidedly adverse mental attitude, it does little

if any damage to the psyche. In summarizing his views on the subject of masturbation, Tenenbaum¹ makes the following intensely valuable points: "(1) Masturbation is one of the most universal ways of sex expression. (2) Ontologically, masturbation performs an important function in the cycle of individual development. It is a physiological by-product of sex development in youth and serves as compensation of repressed desires in the adult. (3) Habitual masturbation is not a malady but a symptom and, therefore, one should not attempt to cure masturbation without an attempt to resolve the underlying conflict of the neurosis, which makes masturbation habit-forming. (4) As an outlet for atavistic and perverse cravings, masturbation performs a socially useful function."

The word "masturbation" has become so well established in medical, psychiatric, and psychological literature that efforts to replace it have met with little success. From time to time Freud has employed *onan-ism* as a synonym, just as Hirschfeld has employed *ipsation*. But neither of these terms has ever enjoyed any considerable popularity.

Of the several kinds of masturbation, the most common seems to be what we know as *manual masturbation*. As the designation itself implies, this is the kind accomplished by the use of the hand. At the same

¹Vide essay by Tenenbaum in *Encyclopaedia Sexualis*, edited by Victor Robinson. New York: Dingwall-Rock, Ltd., 1936.

time, it must be admitted that there are a good many highly excitable persons who are able to carry out a "psychic" masturbation simply by the entertaining of lascivious ideas. It is possible, even probable, that the ability to perform a masturbatory act of this kind indicates a weakness or excessive irritability of the ejaculation centre, which, according to an investigator named Budge, lies at the level of the fourth lumbar vertebra. That the majority of human beings practise some form of masturbation, or have done so at some time in their lives, is a fact so obvious as to require here no additional evidence whatsoever.

Masturbation which serves simply as a substitute for normal sexual activity, when no love-object is available, is known as *physiological* masturbation; the kind which is continued indefinitely in spite of the fact that some love-object is available is known as *pathological* masturbation. It is no exaggeration to state that some persons become so hopelessly addicted to the habit that they find themselves unable to renounce it in favour of any other mode of sexual gratification.

CHAPTER VI

The Nature of Homosexuality

*Shall the thing formed say to him that formed
it, Why hast thou made me thus?*

—ROMANS IX:20

ALTHOUGH IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTER I HAVE made some reference to the subject of homosexuality, it has not been practicable thus far for me to enter with any thoroughness into the intricacies involved here; and I consider this subject to be important enough, not only from the psychological point of view but also from the sociological, to deserve if not demand independent treatment in a separate chapter. Whatever advances we may have made in comparatively recent years in the scientific study of homosexuality, we are still apparently far from any solution to the numerous and varied problems encountered. The time is therefore ripe for a careful reconsideration of homosexuality in its psychological and sociological aspects and implications.

To say that homosexuality has been the most broadly investigated of all sexual anomalies is but to state the simple truth. During the decade which extended from 1898 to 1908, more than one thousand works dealing with the subject appeared in the German language alone. This fact offers striking proof

of how important a host of investigators have considered the homosexual problem to be.

Since the days of Greek antiquity, when the Greeks made a cult of what has later become known as "boy love," homosexuality has remained something of a riddle to the psychologist. With the outward manifestations of homosexuality he is, of course, well acquainted, having observed them in many different occasions; but whether he has gained any profound insight into the deeper psychological kernel of the anomaly is quite another matter. In the following pages we shall occupy ourselves with an objective enquiry into the essential nature of inverted sexuality.

According to Wilhelm Stekel, who has got his information from the philologist Bethe, "boy love" was introduced in Greece by the Dorians. Stekel maintains that although vestiges of the custom are to be found among the Ionians, boy love became fashionable in Greece through the influence of the Dorians. At that time it was customary to court a boy, just as more recently it has become the custom for a man to court a young woman. The favours of a beautiful youth were much desired and, when obtained, very highly prized. The man who desired a particular boy would even go to that boy's family to ask for him. The more distinguished or influential the man happened to be, the more honoured did the boy's family feel, and the more readily that family acceded to the

request. After the boy in question attained to a certain age, he married, settled down, and then, in his turn, became a boy-lover himself. And so it went, this practice which at the time was so fashionable, and which, indeed, was so much a part of the Greek mode of life.

But in spite of the fact that homosexual practices of one kind or another had been known to the world for so long a time, it appears that no attention was given to a formal study of the homosexual question until the latter half of the nineteenth century. At about that time a German named Karl Heinrich Ulrichs, who was a Hanoverian official, began to occupy himself with an attempt to explain the essential nature of the phenomenon. Ulrichs went even so far as to produce a number of works dealing with the subject. He was himself a sexual invert—a circumstance which renders understandable his deep interest. In letters written to his relatives (1862), he described himself as a thoroughgoing homosexual. By 1862, Ulrichs had already begun to employ the term *urning* to designate the male homosexual. This word had been suggested to him by a passage from Plato's *Symposium*. Today it enjoys scarcely any currency in scientific literature.

But Ulrichs, though unquestionably an earnest and not ungifted man, was not a scientist; and thus it remained for Richard von Krafft-Ebing, the famous professor at Graz and Vienna, to enter deeply into

the problem from a strictly scientific point of view. In the earlier editions of his celebrated work, *Psychopathia Sexualis*, Krafft-Ebing designated homosexuality as a functional sign of degeneration, believing that he could divine in it evidence of a serious nervous instability or a severe hereditary taint. This view found prompt acceptance in scientific circles wherever Krafft-Ebing's name and work had become known. Even then, it should be noted, Krafft-Ebing was convinced that deep-rooted homosexuality was congenital rather than acquired, though at one time he had thought that there might be some causal connection between masturbation and homosexuality.

Ultimately, Krafft-Ebing's experience and his increased scientific understanding led him to abandon his earlier opinion of homosexuality; so that in his final work, *New Studies in the Domain of Homosexuality*, published by Magnus Hirschfeld in the year before Krafft-Ebing's death, the master expressed himself as having come to embrace the conception that homosexuality, *per se*, did not constitute a symptom of disease or a functional sign of degeneration, but rather a biological anomaly frequently associated with individuals of distinguished intellect, superior cultural achievements, and keen ethical perceptions.

It may be well to add here that Freud was himself to reject the hypothesis that homosexuality consti-

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tuted a form of degeneracy. Freud was to reject this hypothesis on the following grounds:

(1) The homosexual temperament may manifest itself in people who exhibit no other conspicuous deviations from the normal.

(2) Homosexuality also occurs in people whose capabilities remain unaffected by it, or who are distinguished from the intellectual or cultural point of view.

(3) If we take a broad view of homosexuality, considering all its aspects and manifestations, we encounter at least two facts which render it impossible for us to maintain the theory that homosexuality is a functional sign of degeneration: (a) the fact that such an anomaly of the sexual impulse was not only a frequent thing but indeed virtually an institution among certain ancient nations whilst they were at the very zenith of their culture and civilization; and (b) the fact that homosexuality is known beyond doubt to be prevalent amongst savage or primitive peoples, whereas the idea of "degeneracy" is almost exclusively restricted to nations with a rather highly developed civilization.

Writing in the year 1907, Iwan Bloch (1872-1922) expounded what has since come to be known as "Bloch's anthropological view of homosexuality." Bloch saw in the homosexual, not necessarily a pathological individual, but rather a *different* type of per-

son. On the strength of his own extensive studies and investigations, Bloch had become convinced that homosexuality might just as well occur in healthy persons as in diseased ones. By virtue of his own experience, Bloch came to the staunch conviction that homosexuality was not incapable of existing in a human being along with manifestations of intact physical and mental health. In addition to expounding this view, Bloch showed a truly remarkable insight into the more delicate, more spiritual aspects of homosexual sensibility. At the same time, he was quick enough to distinguish very sharply between genuine homosexuality and all forms of what he himself so aptly termed "pseudo-homosexuality," thereby designating a specious homosexuality which is acquired by experience and is therefore not an essential part of the individual's character or personality. Krafft-Ebing himself had earlier expressed the opinion that a bisexual disposition is never absent in cases of so-called acquired homosexuality. According to Bloch, the pseudo-homosexual is a person who performs homosexual acts without having the genuine homosexual temperament.

The word *homosexual* was first employed in scientific literature by the Hungarian physician Benkert, who in 1869, under the pseudonym of "Kennybert," published a treatise in which he made some permanently valuable observations concerning this deflec-

tion of the sexual instinct. In this work Benkert wrote, among other things:

"In addition to the normal sexual urge in man and woman, Nature in her sovereign mood has endowed at birth certain male and female individuals with a homosexual urge, thus placing them in a sexual bondage which renders them physically and psychically incapable—even with the best intention—of normal erection. This urge creates in advance a direct horror of the opposite sex, and the victim of this passion finds it impossible to suppress the feeling which individuals of his own sex exercise upon him."¹

Benkert's opinion, in substance, remains valid after a lapse of so many years. His pamphlet, which had been practically forgotten, was republished by Hirschfeld in 1905.

Though many competent and well-known investigators have objected to the term *homosexual*—partly because of its hybrid origin—all efforts to replace it with a better word have so far been largely unsuccessful. Some writers have used *contrary sexuality*; others have used *homoerotism* or *homoeroticism*. I have mentioned already that Ulrichs' expression *urn-ing* is now employed scarcely at all.

During the present century, the problems of homo-

¹Quoted, by permission, from Hirschfeld's essay on *Homosexuality* in *Encyclopaedia Sexualis*, edited by Victor Robinson. New York: Dingwall-Rock, Ltd., 1936.

sexuality have been carefully investigated not only by Bloch, but also by Moll, Schrenck-Notzing, Ellis, Hirschfeld, and a host of others. Now let us ponder, from a comparative point of view, without bias, the various findings which have been offered thus far.

As we have seen, Krafft-Ebing and Bloch both agreed that genuine homosexuality is inborn, not acquired. Such men as Magnus Hirschfeld and Havelock Ellis have followed suit, though not without conducting very extensive researches and investigations of their own. As a matter of fact, it is scarcely an exaggeration to state that Hirschfeld and Ellis have perhaps become known as the two chief authorities on the subject. Hirschfeld has made a particularly exhaustive study of homosexuality in all its aspects and manifestations.

On the other hand, such men as Freud, Binet, Stekel, and Adler have all entertained a different opinion. Freud himself, though he admits the existence of "absolute inverts," believes that the homosexual impulse may arise largely from a fixation upon one of the parents. The boy, for instance, so adores his mother that he unconsciously identifies himself with her; and in later years he manifests a feminine mode of sexual perception, desiring to love someone with the same tenderness his mother has lavished upon him. Freud is astute enough, however, also to take into account such undeniably significant factors as

bisexuality and individual sexual constitution. Be that as it may, his hypothesis, upon closer scrutiny, appears to be a rather rigidly circumscribed one, since it gives the impression that it takes into consideration the more superficial rather than the more profound aspects of inversion. Certainly it does not offer a thorough explanation of the more intricate phenomena involved in the nature of homosexuality.

Alfred Binet, the French psychologist, whose theory, in the main, exhibits some similarity to Freud's, has elected to attribute homosexuality to a so-called "*choc fortuit*" (fortuitous shock) experienced in the individual's early life. That Binet's theory, like Freud's, will shrivel if subjected to too close an investigation, I intend to show later in this chapter.

Representatives of Alfred Adler's school of "comparative individual psychology" regard homosexuality as representing the attitude of a person inclined from his early years to seek a roundabout solution of his sexual problems by means of precluding the possibility of disappointment in attachments towards the opposite sex. Adler and his followers, furthermore, believe that sexual inversion is rooted in a fear of women, and that this fear itself springs from a deep sense of inferiority—a psychological phenomenon of which Adler has indeed made much; perhaps, as some would say, too much. The Adlerians draw attention

also to what they deem to be still another causal factor in homosexuality: the subject endeavours to achieve his conquests in such a roundabout manner as is rendered possible by the homosexual approach. In their view this method is perhaps utilized by the individual for the purpose of augmenting his own egocentricity and thus counteracting, in some measure, the feeling of inferiority.

Speaking out of his broad experience extending over a period of many years, Hirschfeld has asserted positively that homosexuality presupposes what he himself terms "a deeply-underlying constitutional predisposition." In other words, the germ of homosexuality is inherent at birth in the individual's very constitution. This concept of Hirschfeld's is based upon many different considerations, to enumerate all of which would undoubtedly require more space than is available within the confines of a single chapter.

Throughout the course of his investigations, Hirschfeld has discovered, among other things, that even the bodily measurements of many homosexuals, male and female, exhibit a noticeable deviation from the normal. Likewise of importance, whether on diagnostic or purely phenomenological grounds, are such features as voice, manner, gait, movements, and the like. Hirschfeld records somewhere that on one occasion he introduced to a colleague of his a person whose face, whose manner, whose every movement bespoke

the born homosexual. His colleague then remarked with a touch of irony: "What a strong *choc fortuit* he must have received!"¹ To assume that all these differences manifested by homosexual individuals—including the purely somatic ones—can stem simply from a parent-fixation or from a so-called "*choc fortuit*" is, in my opinion, to stretch a point very considerably, and to betray an attitude which, strictly speaking, is not scientific. I must admit that, like Magnus Hirschfeld, I see in the mother-fixation of boys or the father-fixation of girls, not the *cause* of homosexuality, but rather the *result*. Vaguely sensing that he is somehow *different*, the homosexual boy turns quite naturally to his mother, as though, because of the very qualities inherent in a feminine temperament, he expected to find in her a certain amount of sympathy or understanding which the masculine nature might lack. I have personally interviewed any number of youthful male homosexuals who have told me how they "adore" their mothers; and some of them have made it a point to inform me how well their mothers "understand" them. It is worth adding that nearly every one of the persons I have in mind at the moment exhibits some purely somatic deviations from the norm, in addition to a number of important psychological deviations.

¹From Hirschfeld's essay on *Homosexuality* in *Encyclopaedia Sexualis*. Quoted by permission of editor.

I should like to say here that I attach but slight importance to environment as a possible ætiological factor in homosexuality. Of the countless persons who have had fundamentally the same kind of upbringing and have been subjected to very similar environmental influences, how many exhibit any manifest homosexual tendencies? Mere honesty compels one to answer the question in this way: *only a very small percentage*. A Protestant minister whose homosexual son had also studied theology remarked to Hirschfeld that this boy, from the very beginning, had been *different* from his other sons. In this case, six sons had been brought up in the same atmosphere and surroundings, and reared in the same religious faith. One of them proved to be homosexual; the others, so far as we know, were heterosexual beings. A more striking instance to show of what small importance environment, *per se*, may be in the ætiology of homosexuality could scarcely be produced or even imagined.

Among the more curious theories of homosexuality is the one which professes to discern some causal connection between masturbation and homosexuality. Notwithstanding the profound respect I feel for certain of Emil Kraepelin's achievements, I am constrained to point out that he himself has been one of those various investigators to insist upon the importance of masturbation as the primary cause of homosexual tendencies.

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Hirschfeld, on the other hand, denies that ipsation—his own term for masturbation—plays any important part whatsoever in the causation of homosexuality. In this connection he writes:¹

“That ipsation is not of decisive importance for the origin of homosexuality is proved by a simple example in arithmetic. If all of 120 orphan boys brought up under the same conditions were addicted to ipsation and later only one proves homosexual; if—another example from life—of 100 persons, 98 are ipsants and of these later only one turns out to be homosexual, 2 bisexual and 96 completely heterosexual, then we can hardly look upon ipsation as sufficient ground for the homosexual urge.”

Long before puberty, the homosexual child, as though very vaguely aware of being different in some respect from other children, may feel himself drawn exclusively towards persons of the same sex. At puberty this unconscious urge on his part crystallizes into an unmistakably sexual attachment. During such a period of his life, the homosexual child, moreover, frequently feels moody and discontented without really knowing the reason why he feels so. Already present in such a boy or girl, in the majority of instances, are definite characterological differences which point clearly, or even decisively, towards an

¹Quoted, by permission of editor, from Hirschfeld's essay on *Homosexuality* in *Encyclopaedia Sexualis*.

inversion of sexuality. Paul Näcke was the first to draw attention to the fact that the dreams of homosexual individuals manifest from the beginning a content which is indicative of homosexual sensibility. That Stekel regards as "obsolete" Näcke's opinion of this diagnostic importance of dreams in connection with homosexuality is a point which one ought not to permit himself to take too seriously; because whilst Stekel emphatically insists that homosexuality is acquired, he has failed, to the best of my knowledge, to present a single cogent argument in favour of his view. At any rate, in the first volume of *The Interpretation of Dreams*,¹ he expresses himself as follows:

"Dreams are of the utmost value as aids to diagnosis. It is about thirty years since Näcke pointed out that the dream was a trustworthy guide to the diagnosis of what he regarded as 'inborn homosexuality.' His views are now obsolete. (First of all, homosexuality is not congenital but acquired. Secondly, manifest homosexuals often have heterosexual dreams. Thirdly, since everyone has a homosexual component, everyone can have homosexual dreams.")

It seems to me that Stekel, like Freud and Adler, has carefully taken into account the purely psycho-

¹Stekel, Wilhelm: *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Arranged for American publication by E. A. Guthrie. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1943.

genic factors in homosexuality, but has accorded very little earnest attention to the possibility of constitutional factors. The result is bound to be a theory which, even at best, remains one-sided.

From nothing I have said thus far is it to be deduced that all male homosexuals are outwardly feminine, or all female ones outwardly masculine. Not infrequently, to be sure, we encounter a male homosexual who shows little if any outward evidence of inversion. If in other instances certain outward differences exist, they may be of so tenuous a character as to escape the untrained eye. Occasionally a simple gesture, or perhaps a way of speaking, may be sufficient to convey to the initiated an impression of homosexuality in a particular individual.

Without wishing to deny the validity of Bloch's deduction that homosexuality is not necessarily incompatible with complete physical and mental health, I nevertheless feel compelled to point out that this condition is quite frequently observed in persons who show some outward evidence of a neuropathic disposition or of a general nervous or emotional instability. On the other hand, we are not justified in assuming *a priori* that every homosexual person is necessarily neurotic simply because his sexual impulse happens to be inverted.

As forms of homosexual intercourse we may mention *fellatio*, or *coitus in os*; *pædicatio*, or *coitus per*

anum; mutual masturbation; and *coitus inter femora*. Occasionally *anilingus* (that is, the apposition of the mouth to the anus) is practised, though many a homosexual professes to find such a procedure revolting unless the sexual object happens to be just the person he especially desires in a sexual way. It is very difficult to say positively what form of homosexual intercourse is practised most frequently. My own conviction is that the choice of a mode of gratification may be dictated by such considerations as chance to prevail at the moment. I believe, moreover, that some investigators have been inclined to stress a little too strongly the frequency of mutual masturbation.

The question is sometimes asked whether homosexuals prefer persons of their own kind, or whether they lean towards persons who are normally constituted in the sexual respect. This question cannot be answered in half a dozen words. It is my honest conviction that the genuine male homosexual prefers, as a rule, a man whose sexual impulse is not inverted; and that a female homosexual, or "lesbian," is attracted mostly, if not exclusively, to young women who are feminine inwardly as well as outwardly. (Cf. the heroine of Miss Radclyffe Hall's famous novel, *The Well of Loneliness*.) It is no secret that a young man with a thoroughly masculine nature and a powerfully developed sexual impulse is capable of exercising a peculiar, even irresistible fascination upon the femi-

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nine nature with which a homosexual man is endowed. Such a contrast between two natures provides for the homosexual a sense of glamour and excitement. Small wonder, then, that male inverts so often find themselves enormously attracted to athletes, pugilists, and physical culturists; to say nothing of young men who are serving in uniform. It is hardly an exaggeration, in fact, to add that a host of male homosexuals are as little attracted to their own kind as they are to individuals of the opposite sex. But I cannot and must not deny that to a certain number of homosexuals, male and female, it is largely a matter of indifference whether the persons with whom they desire to become sexually intimate are themselves homosexual or heterosexual.

It is interesting to glance at the psychology of heterosexual persons who grant sexual favours to homosexual ones. What motives operate here? Among them we may enumerate pity, friendship, understanding, material gain, and the desire for sexual gratification. Perhaps simple curiosity also should be mentioned; to say nothing of a longing to taste a different kind of sexual pleasure. We can only speculate, of course, upon the relative frequency of any single one of these various motives which have been mentioned. But the fact does remain that numerous heterosexuals grant sexual favours day after day to homosexuals without, as a consequence, suffering any damage

where the direction of their own sexual impulse is concerned.

Where sexual intimacy between two male people takes place, it is generally the passive partner—i.e., the feminine male—who is regarded with contempt. Such contempt has prevailed for a long time in many civilized countries. It did not fail to occur to Krafft-Ebing that “in homosexual intercourse effeminated men feel themselves in the act always as a woman.”

To accept the view that homosexuality represents a fixation upon some early stage of one's development is to imply that homosexual individuals have not achieved emotional maturity. Such a concept is egregiously at variance with the facts as we know them. When we read the list of celebrated people *known* to have been homosexual, we find it impossible to convince ourselves that such beings as these were emotionally or otherwise immature. This is intended, not to convey the impression that I believe *all* homosexuals to be emotionally superior to average persons, but rather to make the point that I do not believe homosexuals to be emotionally immature simply because they happen to be sexually inverted. What is true of the homosexual's emotional make-up is no less true of his intellectual development. Just as heterosexual people can be dull or clever, plain or colourful, so can homosexual ones. It is to Hirschfeld's everlasting credit that he has been so sharply aware of a gen-

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eral parallelism between homosexual and heterosexual phenomena.

In the chapter devoted to the glands of internal secretion, I shall take up the endocrinological concept of the anomaly in question. My own views on the subject of homosexuality I can summarize briefly by pointing out that I do not believe a parent-fixation, a "choc fortuit," or any other purely extraneous influence is potent enough, *per se*, to alter so radically the whole direction of a person's sexual desire, to account for the somatic differences so many homosexuals manifest, or to explain satisfactorily the amazing tenacity inherent in the very nature of this phenomenon.

Other Irregularities of the Sexual Impulse

*Nature has moods which baffle to the end.
We are but minions that obey her will.
And not for all our queries will she bend
To make reply: her lips are mute and still.
Thus instincts are deflected from their aim,
And man is left to cope with strange desire
Which he can neither sublimate nor tame;
Which smoulders in him like a hidden fire.*

*Those who have never found the common track
Still linger in this shadowy domain,
Spurred by a fierce impulse which others lack
Whose joys are sought upon a different plane.
No more of moralizing: it may be
Our endocrines control our destiny!*

—NATHANIEL THORNTON

IF IT BE TRUE, AS GOETHE HAS POINTED OUT, THAT Nature best reveals herself in her abnormalities, then surely the sexual sphere should be a fruitful one for the student of psychology. Though homosexuality, as we have seen, deserves particular attention because it is so important no less from the sociological than from the psychological point of view, we must not fall into the error of supposing that we can afford simply to ignore these other irregular manifestations of sexuality. To do so would be to take an unjustifiably circumscribed view of the sexual province.

After an appropriate consideration of the *manifest* impulses which operate in these anomalies, let us speculate briefly upon certain influences which may possibly have caused the sexual instinct to become moulded in this or that direction. It is but fair, however, for me to state in advance that so far a precise determination of ætiological (causal) factors in *psychopathia sexualis* (Krafft-Ebing's general term for atypical manifestations of sexuality) has not proved feasible. Some investigators have stressed almost exclusively the *pathological* aspects of *psychopathia*

sexualis; others have studied these anomalies more from the point of view of their *anthropological* significance. The chance remains, of course, that psychoanalysis, as it continues to grow and to enlarge its scope of enquiry, may ultimately provide us with a clearer insight into such things than we obviously possess at present.

It is estimated that sadism and masochism are the most frequent of the aberrations to be considered in this chapter. Apart from their frequency, these have a good deal in common with each other. Krafft-Ebing not only studied sadism and masochism but also made attempts to explain them and to establish their ætiology. It was he, in fact, who coined the very names by which they have since been known. Since the time of Krafft-Ebing, a number of competent sexual scientists have devoted serious attention to these two anomalies, though sadism and masochism have been rather less widely investigated than homosexuality, for instance, has been.

Sadism takes its name from that of the notorious Marquis de Sade, a brilliant but thoroughly perverse Frenchman who dissipated his energy and talents in a lifelong series of recurrent sexual orgies. That he himself was addicted to the practice of sadism, it is difficult for anyone to doubt who has read the several books in which he so vividly described the most amazing sadistic orgies. His very graphic descriptions

of these affairs have since been thought to possess some value from the scientific point of view. De Sade died in a madhouse at an abundantly ripe age, having spent a not inconsiderable part of his life in practising the sexual perversion the name of which is derived from his own.

In actual sadism, the sexual satisfaction depends upon the infliction of physical pain; and such an infliction of pain may in a number of cases displace the sexual act itself. The idea of pain arouses the sadist to a high peak of erotic excitement—often to the point of his experiencing a particularly intense orgasm. In attempting to analyse this peculiarity of the sexual instinct, we find it to be mostly an exaggeration of a procedure which exists in more or less normal amatory relationships in the form of biting, pinching, or squeezing. In such relationships, the biting, pinching, or squeezing is merely in the nature of a preparatory act, or a kind of prelude to the sexual act itself; in other words, it does not actually take the place of this act. Thus do we establish a differentiation between the *physiological* aspects of sadism and what some psychologists regard as the distinctly *pathological* ones. Everybody is well acquainted with the tendency of the male to be aggressive and domineering. In genuine sadism this same tendency may simply become intensified beyond a certain rather vaguely defined limit. In some instances, in fact, it may be hard to determine

just where minor sadism ends and major sadism begins. Until we are able to explain fully this aggressive impulse which, to all intents and purposes, is inherent in the psychological make-up of the male, we shall find it difficult to gain an intimate understanding of the more intricate aspects of the sadistic urge.

There is also a form of sadism which may be designated as *mental sadism*. In this form the desire is for the infliction of pain of a mental character. The use of particularly coarse or filthy language may be a concomitant of mental sadism. Some sadists, however, employ more delicate means of torturing their victims.

Masochism takes its name from that of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, an Austrian novelist. A masochist himself, Sacher-Masoch described the perversion in two or three novels, the best-known of which is *Venus in Furs*. His first wife, Mme Wanda von Dunajew, was a sadist; and the agreement drawn up between them remains one of the most amazing documents ever written in any language.

Masochism is the direct counterpart of sadism. Just as the sadist exults in the infliction of pain, so does the masochist exult in the receiving of it. In masochism such pain may be of a physical or mental character. Where it exists exclusively in the mind or the imagination, we are justified in speaking of *moral* or *ideal* masochism. In such a case the masochist may be content merely to be overwhelmed with a torrent of

abusive language, or perhaps to be called by particularly filthy and degrading names.

Krafft-Ebing and others have reported also cases of what we know as *symbolic* masochism. Here the masochist may be satisfied with the mere *suggestion* of danger or degradation. A man, for instance, might have a woman bind his arms and legs and leave him in that state of helplessness for a certain time. Such a suggestion of peril, or of subjection to the will of another, might in itself suffice to give complete sexual satisfaction; neither physical blows nor obscene language would be required to induce an orgasm.

There are still other known cases of masochism—cases, for instance, in which the individuals affected might be led by the desire for the utmost degradation of themselves to such practices as *urolagnia* and *coprolagnia*. By these terms we understand, respectively, the drinking of urine and the tasting or eating of fæces. The more he can debase himself, the lower the level to which he can reduce his humanity, the happier the true masochist is.

Just as sadism so often suggests an exaggeration or intensification of the male impulse towards aggressiveness, so does masochism suggest an exaggeration or intensification of the female impulse towards submissiveness. If, however, we encounter sadism in a woman or masochism in a man, we are apt to find that the anomaly exists in a rather extreme form.

Another sexual abnormality the nature of which has never been fully explained is the one we know as *fetichism*. This appears to have its roots in an impulse which is common to the great majority of human beings. As regards the origin of fetichism, Krafft-Ebing¹ has expressed himself as follows: "With respect to the evolution of physiological love, it is probable that its germ is always to be sought and to be found in an individual fetichistic charm which a person of one sex exercises upon a person of the opposite sex."

With certain everyday manifestations of fetichism we are all well acquainted. It is not uncommon—to give a single instance—for a lover, during his loved one's absence, to fondle and even kiss some object belonging to the loved one. No one can deny that even so innocent a thing is in reality a species of minor fetichism. In genuine fetichism, however, the libido may become fixated upon a particular part of the body rather than upon the sexual object as a whole. In more radical cases the libido may even be transferred completely away from the sexual object to some article of clothing or some other inanimate thing which the sexual object has worn or used. Fetichism, moreover, is known to exist in a large variety of forms; thus we speak of head fetichism, nose fetichism, handkerchief fetichism, shoe fetichism, and so on, *ad infinitum*. In-

¹Krafft-Ebing, Richard von: *Psychopathia Sexualis*. Authorized translation. New York: Pioneer Publications, 1939.

deed, almost any object or any part of the human body may serve as a fetich. Because of the prevalence of both shoe fetichism and foot fetichism, Iwan Bloch has invented the term *retifism* to designate them. This word Bloch has coined from the name of a famous French educator who is known to have been a fetichist.

Exhibitionism is a species of sexual perversion in which the person affected derives pleasure, or even an orgasm, from showing off his genitals. The pleasure thus derived may be lessened or enhanced according to the reaction of whoever chances to witness such an act on the exhibitionist's part. Where exhibitionism serves merely as a sort of prelude to some more natural sexual activity, it is said to be merely physiological in character. Should the exhibitionistic act become compulsive, however, or displace all other forms of sexual activity, then it is said to be a pathological phenomenon. In a fine passage devoted to a description of exhibitionistic phenomena, Stekel writes: "Exhibitionism (desire to expose oneself) is a phenomenon so widely spread that, were it not branded as pathological behaviour due to attendant peculiar circumstances, it might be considered a normal trait. No one will consider pathological, a man who divests himself of his clothing in the presence of the beloved object when they are alone together; but the same act committed in the presence of strangers or in the street,

is already the act of a sick man."¹ Stekel goes on to say that pathological exhibitionism is very widespread, and that its victims are usually men.

The relation between exhibitionism and *scopophilia* is the same as that between sadism and masochism. The one is active; the other is passive. The exhibitionist derives pleasure from exposing his sexual organs; the scopophile derives pleasure from the witnessing of such an act. The boring of holes through doors and walls is sometimes done by scopophiles for the purpose of facilitating their looking at persons whose sexual organs can be seen. What has been said already about physiological and pathological exhibitionism is no less true of physiological and pathological scopophilia. Scopophiles are sometimes termed *voyeurs*. Whether the actions of so-called "peeping Toms" are physiologically or pathologically motivated cannot always be determined with absolute certainty. A special form of scopophilia is *mixoscopia*. By this term we understand pleasurable excitement caused by watching others engaged in sexual acts.

Transvestitism I have always considered to be one of the most remarkable irregularities encountered in the whole field of sexual science. By this term we understand, specifically, a tendency on the individual's part to assume not only the dress but also the mental

¹From Stekel's essay on *Compulsive Acts* in *Encyclopaedia Sexualis*. By permission of editor.

attitude of the opposite sex. Havelock Ellis has suggested the more euphonious term *eonism* as a substitute for *transvestitism*, coining the designation from the name of a Frenchman who remains one of the most famous transvestites of all time.

Transvestitism may or may not coexist with homosexuality: Hirschfeld, for one, is convinced that the former may exist as a perfectly independent phenomenon. Stekel, on the other hand, believes that where transvestitism is concerned we must take into account either a stressed bisexuality or a repressed homosexual urge. For Stekel such a view is surely not unnatural, because he remains, to some extent, a representative of the psychoanalytical school.

We speak of "name transvestites" and "clothing transvestites." It is thought that George Sand, the French novelist, was a transvestite in both respects. In some individuals the urge to adopt the clothing and the mental attitude of the opposite sex is so strong as to defy all efforts which may be made to uproot it. One famous transvestite is known to have spent many years of his life as a woman. There is no evidence to point towards any homosexual impulse on his part.

In dealing with the ætiology of *psychopathia sexualis*, we are apt to discover a certain amount of confusion and contradiction. I have suggested earlier that

the last word, probably, is yet to be said. We must bear in mind that up to the time of Krafft-Ebing there was scarcely a single psychologist or medical man who appeared to understand even the most manifest impulses operative in *psychopathia sexualis*. Until the end of his career, Krafft-Ebing himself energetically maintained that both sadism and masochism are congenital rather than acquired phenomena. This view of Krafft-Ebing's, even after a lapse of so many years, still merits our consideration if we remember that sadism or masochism, in the ultimate analysis, may be merely an exaggeration or an intensification of an urge which is inherently present in the one sex or the other; i.e., the aggressive impulse in the male or the submissive impulse in the female. More recently, however, the concept has prevailed in scientific circles that such peculiarities of the sexual instinct represent fixations upon component impulses (Freud) of which that instinct is made up. For instance, a boy's sexual drive may become fixated upon the anal-sadistic stage of that boy's development—so strongly fixated that sublimation is not achieved later. Thus that particular individual becomes a sadist. Whether this is the scientific explanation or the merely convenient one remains to be seen.

Binet and the Freudians have attributed fetichism to accidental experiences in early life. Schrenck-Notzing has embraced the same opinion. Hirschfeld, on

the other hand, sees in fetichism the possible expression of an individual sexual constitution. Lipschütz, in his *Internal Secretions of the Sexual Glands*, has expressed himself very similarly in this regard, though I do not know whether the postulate has been confirmed by any other experts in endocrinology. I believe the quotation which I have chosen to introduce this chapter will do something, perhaps, towards conveying my own impression that the predisposition to *psychopathia sexualis*—or, the very germ of *psychopathia sexualis*—may be inherent in an individual constitution at the time of birth, and that it may later be awakened and rendered active by some fortuitous experience in childhood, or else by some trauma sustained during the earlier years of the child's life.

Exhibitionism seems to represent a fixation upon some component impulse in the sexual instinct, though this theory hardly suffices to explain the *compulsive* character which this perversion is sometimes known to assume. We can now hardly doubt that the child evinces definite exhibitionistic traits during some early phase of development. Should this tendency remain unsublimated, it may crystallize after puberty into a form of genuine exhibitionism. I cannot fully agree with Stekel¹ when he writes as follows: "Exhibitionism, in my opinion, is rooted in self-love

¹The reader may wish to consult Stekel's essay on *Compulsive Acts* in *Encyclopaedia Sexualis*.

(narcissism) and in the belief in the magic power of one's own beauty. The neurotic (paraph) believes not only in the omnipotence of his thought but also in that of his body. Exhibitionism is the breaking through of a powerful self-love and a projection of subjective evaluation of the surroundings. This overvaluation of the body might be considered generally as a psychic phenomenon." What Stekel says in this passage is true, in my estimation, only of the most superficial forms of exhibitionism—such forms, for instance, as we encounter among egocentric individuals whose bodies really are attractive. It has nothing, I think, to do with those forms we observe in persons who at other times are rather shy and retiring, and who are not endowed with striking physiques. Nor does Stekel's hypothesis explain at all why it is that in certain persons the exhibitionistic urge becomes positively compulsive and irresistible.

The orthodox psychoanalytical school appears to have studied scopophilia very little from the ætiological point of view. Stekel himself attributes it to a childhood trauma. Whether such a theory of its causation is valid we cannot say until our knowledge is more extensive; because the truth is that we really do not know definitely what produces such a phenomenon as scopophilia.

It is a conspicuous service of Sigmund Freud's to have suggested that we apply what we have learned

about infantile sexuality to the study of problems inherent in sexual perversion. With that almost intuitive acumen which is characteristic of his thought-processes at their best, he has been able to divine a somewhat intimate relation between the character of infantile sexuality and that of perverted sexuality. His theory—to state the matter briefly—rests upon the recognition that in the former, just as in the latter, form of sexuality a component impulse is seen to be the motivating factor—an impulse which in the case of perverted sexuality continues to develop independently instead of taking a relatively subordinate place in the sexual instinct as an integrated whole.

CHAPTER VIII

The Question of Neurosis

*Said one among them—"Surely not in vain
My substance of the common Earth was ta'en
And to this Figure moulded, to be broke,
Or trampled back to shapeless Earth again."*

—THE RUBÁIYÁT OF OMAR KHAYYÁM

FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID IN PRECEDING CHAPTERS of this book, the reader has begun, I doubt not, to gain an insight into those intensely varied and sometimes equally intricate processes of which the human psyche is capable. Occasionally the psychic processes in man may be accomplished with a complexity which all but thwarts our attempts at analysis. If we are to probe such processes to their core, a nearly superhuman patience and perseverance may be required. Let us always be sure that the connections we establish are fundamentally logical; let us forbear to travel along the all too easy path of wild theories and fantastic surmises. The need for objectivity of approach cannot be emphasized too strongly. Those who permit themselves to become merely subjective or emotional will defeat their own purpose. Scientific knowledge of the abnormal is not to be monopolized by a chosen few: it is for all who are capable of absorbing it. *"Not for its own sake is science, but for all humanity."*¹

¹This beautiful inscription once appeared above the door of the Ernst Haeckel Memorial Hall in the famous Institut für Sexualwissenschaft, Berlin.

Already we have considered the functions of the id, the ego, and the super-ego. In the well-adjusted personality these three agents perform their functions with a proper balance and correlation. If, on the other hand—to repeat a point made in a previous chapter—the ego should fail in its efforts to reconcile the strivings of the id with the exigencies of outside reality, then the result is likely to take the form of a disturbance in the individual's psychic equilibrium.

In our consideration of the phenomena encountered in the psychopathology of everyday life, we have assumed that these various little acts, slips, and mistakes belonging to the province of everyday life occur sporadically rather than regularly. In other words, we have based our observations and deductions upon the hypothesis that they do not occur with sufficient frequency to give us the impression that the individual's psychic structure or equilibrium has been appreciably disturbed. I repeat that such acts, slips, and mistakes are occasional rather than habitual. For this reason we ascribe to them, where the individual's fundamental coördination is concerned, no grave significance whatsoever. More often than not, we just accept such things as innocuous concomitants of everyday existence.

The time is ripe now for some consideration of more serious disturbances in the realm of the psyche. We are now ready, indeed, to give our attention to distinctly neurotic phenomena.

THE QUESTION OF NEUROSIS

In what follows, we shall rely for the most part upon what Sigmund Freud himself has taught us about the origin, the nature, and the symptoms of neurosis. In his view neurosis is the result of some conflict between the id and the ego; or, to put the matter differently, a conflict between the individual's instinctual tendencies and his conscious moral self. A number of writers, and indeed most reputable dictionaries, including Webster's *New International*, continue to define neurosis in some such fashion as the following: "A functional disorder of the nervous system, without anatomical lesion." For psychiatric textbooks and clinical discussions, this definition is no doubt still effectual enough, but for our purpose Karen Horney's definition—i.e., "psychic disturbance"—is perhaps to be preferred. At least this second definition does more to suggest the *psychogenic* character of the disorder.

In order to distinguish them positively from so-called "psychoneuroses," Freud has himself designated several neuroses as "actual neuroses." To me, however, it seems unlikely that such a distinction holds amongst living writers, most of whom are prone to use interchangeably the terms "neurosis" and "psychoneurosis." And it may be worth mentioning that Alfred Adler, to mention but one psychologist in particular, has employed "neurosis" to designate almost any psychic disturbance not involving a radical disintegration of personality or affecting too many

aspects of the individual's self-adjustment. That numerous writers have followed Alfred Adler's example cannot be questioned by anyone who has read much psychoanalytical literature.

Now that we have at least established what is generally understood by "neurosis," let us go on to ponder a few of the symptoms by which neurotic behaviour is characterized. Freud declares that the neurotic symptom arises "when a new form of satisfaction of libido is sought." Thus we see that in his opinion such a symptom is of definitely sexual origin. At this point it may be expedient to remind the student of Freud's famous dictum to the effect that neurosis is not possible in a life which is well-regulated from the sexual point of view. Perhaps it is well to mention also that neurotic symptoms are apt to vary, whether quantitatively or qualitatively, in accordance with the basic structure of a particular neurosis.

Ever since Freud first insisted so energetically upon its importance, the question of *anxiety* has been emphasized more and more. Among living psychologists, Karen Horney has made anxiety the subject of some extensive investigation and consideration. In her writings she employs the term *basic anxiety* to indicate a feeling of helplessness towards a potentially hostile world. Moreover, anxiety is undoubtedly a symptom which we find associated with a variety of nosologically differentiated neuroses.

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Anxiety, as we here understand it, means an ill-defined sense of impending danger. The individual affected with anxiety knows that he is disturbed about something; the precise and immediate cause of the anxiety, however, remains obscure to him. Neurotic anxiety can be distinguished from normal anxiety by the excess or disproportion inherent in the former. It is perhaps expedient also to draw a distinction between fear and neurotic anxiety. Where fear is the response to a particular situation or set of circumstances, the individual has a reasonably clear notion of what it is that he dreads; that is to say, the vagueness discernible in anxiety is not present in fear. The neurotic person may fear, not one tangible thing in particular, but rather a combination of things in general. He may dread his contacts with his fellow-creatures; he may dread going out into the world to earn a living; he may dread some illness or disease, even though there be no special likelihood of his contracting it. Such an individual, moreover, may be tortured by the feeling that something—he knows not what—is going to happen to him; that he may find himself unfit to cope with the exigencies of everyday life. We therefore consider to be suffering from *anxiety* any person who manifests such states of feeling as I have just described. If, on the other hand, an individual sights enemy aeroplanes over the houses in his own neighbourhood and hence has reason to believe that his own home may be

bombed at any moment, that individual is conscious, not of neurotic anxiety, but of *fear*. Such fear is in itself not neurotic but natural, because we are to assume that it is not out of logical proportion to the danger actually involved.

Freud himself has mentioned a sort of "free-floating anxiety" which is always ready enough to attach itself to anything attended with the merest suggestion of danger.

Where anxiety is itself the most conspicuous, most highly developed symptom, we are justified in speaking specifically of what Freud has termed the "anxiety neurosis." This he has recognized as an "actual neurosis," thus laying some emphasis upon the purely physiological reactions—i.e., vomiting, sweating, diarrhoea, tremors, etc.—to which the neurosis is known in some cases to give rise.

Amongst other distinguishing marks which we may take as characteristic of the neurotic temperament in general are hypersensitivity, feelings of inferiority, the need for affection, a sense of guilt, and a striving for power. Many a neurotic person, according to Alfred Adler's system of psychology, goes through life building up one defensive or compensatory mechanism after another by way of appeasing, or perhaps counteracting, an exaggerated sense of his own inferiority. In his endeavours to render himself secure against this feeling, he is oftentimes led to what Alfred

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Adler so aptly has termed "overcompensation." And how do we recognize, for instance, the neurotic need for affection? We recognize it simply by the same exaggeration or disproportion that we discover in all other neurotic traits. After a while this same need for affection becomes so obsessive that the neurotic would like to dominate completely the life of the person from whom he craves affection. As Horney has pointed out, he may attempt to win the loved one over by means of such expedients as the doing of favours, the giving of presents, etc. The winning of affection, like the winning of power, is designed, naturally, to fortify the neurotic against a painful feeling of psychic or organic inferiority. Surely it must remain to Alfred Adler's credit that he has been able to discern in the neurotic personality a sort of "will to power."

Perhaps it is not out of order for me to observe here that we must not fall into the error of overemphasizing the difference between neurotic behaviour and normal behaviour. As Ernest Jones has astutely remarked, the whole deviation of the neurotic from the normal is a quantitative matter, not a qualitative one.

Now that we have considered certain symptoms which are more or less typical of neurotic behaviour in general, we are ready to concentrate our attention for a while upon the more specific types of neuroses. In some instances we shall find the symptomatology so well defined that an immediate classification of that

neurosis will be feasible. I doubt very much, however, whether the task will always prove so facile; for it is not unusual to find in a single individual a combination of symptoms not all of which point towards a disturbance of a particular kind. There may, in other words, be a decided mingling of symptoms. Freud has observed that a neurosis is almost invariably overdetermined. By this he means simply that several factors may be operative in its ætiology. I cannot emphasize too strongly that we are dealing with human beings, in whom a host of purely individual differences are apt to exist. An orthodox clinical procedure is one thing; a study of the human psyche in its varying aspects and ramifications is quite another. To confuse the two procedures would be to thwart our purpose.

In what follows, I shall limit myself almost exclusively to a consideration of those neuroses about which we possess the clearest information. Those which are obscure, those which are but rarely encountered, will receive little attention. I shall also, for the most part, limit myself to a chiefly descriptive point of view, knowing well that any effort on my part in the direction of suggesting cures would be definitely outside the scope of such a work as this.

Of those neuroses about which Sigmund Freud has taught us most, no other one has perhaps so striking, so well-defined, a symptomatology as what in England is generally called "obsessional neurosis," and in

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America "compulsion neurosis." In dealing with this phenomenon, we have to do chiefly with an irresistible, uncontrollable urge—or, if one prefers this term, an "obsession"—which causes the individual affected to do or say a particular thing, or to behave in some particular way. The compulsive act, whatever its nature, may well be a childish or senseless one; but even though the individual be aware of its childishness or senselessness, he finds himself powerless to behave otherwise. Should he make a herculean effort to avoid performing the act, what is the result? The result is that he is tortured by the most acute anxiety until he finally obeys the urge.

The compulsion involved may drive the individual to the performance of any one of many different acts; for example, the excessive washing of the hands, or stopping in the street to count up to some number, or the repetition of a particular word or phrase. In a preceding chapter I have said that the mechanism of displacement may operate in obsessional neurosis. Now let us imagine that someone has acquired an absurd mania for washing his hands. On the surface this may argue merely an intense, highly developed desire for physical cleanliness. What, however, lies at the core of this compulsion? We may find here a sort of unconscious atonement for an early carelessness about the individual's personal habits; or perhaps an exaggeration of something which as a child he did against

his will. Thus we see that the obsession may very well have its roots in childhood experiences which have somehow predisposed the individual towards this form of neurosis.

It is not too much to say that Freud has attached great significance to the obsessive act. He writes:¹ "All this would be proof enough that the obsessive act is full of meaning; it *seems* to be a representation, a repetition of that all-important scene." The following case, reported by Freud² a number of years ago, still remains one of the classic examples of obsessional neurosis:

"A lady of nearly thirty years of age suffered from a very severe obsessional symptom. I might perhaps have been able to help her if my work had not been destroyed by the caprice of fate. In the course of a day she would perform the following peculiar obsessive act, among others, several times over. She would run out of her room into the adjoining one, there take up a certain position at the table in the centre of the room, ring for her maid, give her a trivial order or send her away, and then run back again. There was certainly nothing very dreadful about this, but it might well arouse curiosity. The explanation

¹Freud, Sigmund: *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*. Translated by Joan Riviere. New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1920.

²*Ibid.*

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presented itself in the simplest and most unexceptionable manner, without any assistance on the part of the analyst. I cannot imagine how I could even have suspected the meaning of this obsession or could possibly have suggested an interpretation for it. Every time I had asked the patient, 'Why do you do this? What is the meaning of it?' she had answered, 'I don't know.' But one day, after I had succeeded in overcoming a great hesitation on her part, involving a matter of principle, she suddenly did know, for she related the history of the obsessive act. More than ten years previously she had married a man very much older than herself, who had proved impotent on the wedding-night. Innumerable times on that night he had run out of his room into hers in order to make the attempt, but had failed every time. In the morning he had said angrily: 'It's enough to disgrace one in the eyes of the maid who does the beds,' and seizing a bottle of red ink which happened to be at hand he poured it on the sheet, but not exactly in the place where such a mark might have been. At first I did not understand what this recollection could have to do with the obsessive act in question; for I could see no similarity between the two situations, except in the running from one room into the other, and perhaps also in the appearance of the servant on the scene. The patient then led me to the table in the adjoining room, where I found a great mark on the table-cover. She explained

further that she stood by the table in such a way that when the maid came in she could not miss seeing this mark. After this, there could no longer be any doubt about the connection between the current obsessive act and the scene on the wedding-night, though there was still a great deal to learn about it."

By insisting years ago upon the *psychic* origin of hysteria, Freud has exerted considerable influence upon our whole concept of this neurosis. Small wonder, then, that hysteria, with the passage of time, has come to be known as "the classical subject-matter of psychoanalytical investigation." Up to the time of Freud's recognition of the psychogenic factors in hysteria, it had been generally assumed that the disorder must be ascribed to a disturbance or "degeneration" of the central nervous system, although it is true that Charcot, in Paris, had enunciated the hypothesis that hysterical symptoms might very well be superinduced by ideation—that is to say, that a "morbid" idea, for instance, might have its rôle in the production of the symptoms.

It is a fact that the symptoms of hysteria vary widely enough. They may be of a *sensory* kind, associated with blindness or deafness. If they have a *motor* character, we observe paralyses, abnormal gaits and movements, etc. Among those symptoms of the *vasomotor*

type, we encounter, for instance, pathological feelings of coldness and warmth, to say nothing of pathological blushing. We designate as *visceral* symptoms those which are associated with gastro-intestinal disturbances. Hysteria also has certain *mental* symptoms, i.e., amnesia, delirium, somnambulism, fugues, anxiety, etc.

Nowadays it is customary to divide hysteria into two basic types. The one we call *anxiety hysteria*; the other we call *conversion hysteria*. The former is so designated because the primary symptom is anxiety; the latter because it invariably produces a *somatic* disturbance. In conversion hysteria almost any part of the body may become affected through the instrumentality of psychic processes which on the surface appear quite obscure. Here, as a rule, we find but little anxiety beyond that which seems to be the more or less logical result of the somatic disorder. Of fairly common occurrence in cases of conversion hysteria are tics of one kind or another. If these be studied closely and carefully, they almost invariably reveal a significance of their own. A particular kind of tic might, for instance, be interpreted as a masturbatic equivalent.

Another neurosis attended frequently enough with physical complaints is the one known as *neurasthenia*. Originally generic, the term by which we designate this neurosis has now come to be regarded as nosological. By this we mean, to clothe the matter in every-

day language, that neurasthenia is now regarded mostly as an independent neurosis, and not merely as a symptom. What is usually diagnosed as neurasthenia is in Bleuler's opinion merely "pseudoneurasthenia"; and this term he would be ready to adopt "if it were not too long."

In neurasthenia the purely physical manifestations are more vaguely defined than in conversion hysteria. Neurasthenics complain of feelings of lassitude; they complain of fatigue and so-called "nervous irritability." It is not unusual for them to be completely lacking in self-confidence, or to labour under the impression that some such function as that, for instance, of memory has become impaired. As a more or less natural concomitant of symptoms like these, a general anxiety forces itself into the picture. Some neurasthenics prove to be fine-fibred, deeply introverted individuals who have active if not creative minds. Freud himself considers that purely sexual factors like excessive masturbation and the familiar nocturnal pollutions are not without their rôle in the ætiology of neurasthenia. A so-called "nervous breakdown," even when it cannot be specifically diagnosed as neurasthenia, probably almost always betrays an appreciable neurasthenic component. Because of its physiological concomitants, neurasthenia is one of these several conditions Freud has described as "actual neuroses."

A neurosis which apparently results solely from

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some particular psychic or somatic injury is said to be a *traumatic neurosis*. It may be occasioned by an injury to almost any part of the body: the older idea that only a brain trauma could produce such a disturbance is now scarcely tenable. Traumatic neurosis occurs both in military and in civilian life. In military life it usually results from a series of traumatic experiences, the last of which is perhaps not the most severe, whereas in civilian life it generally follows a single trauma. Here the rôle of anxiety, as in so many other neuroses, assumes considerable proportions. It has been said that an expeditious adjustment of insurance and/or compensation claims may be very beneficial to the sufferer, actually facilitating his recovery.

It is my personal conviction that the question of *occupational neurosis* has not as yet been amply considered even from a strictly phenomenological point of view. We have been instructed that no occupation in and of itself can cause neurosis; but experience shows plainly that there are certain kinds of employment which have a deleterious effect upon individuals who are neurotically predisposed, or who are forced by circumstances into work against which they consciously or unconsciously rebel. For the sake of hypothesis let us assume that a gifted, sensitive, highly organized person finds it necessary to do tedious clerical work for some considerable time. With the passage of

time he begins to complain of having pains in both eyes. He consults an ophthalmologist, who is unable, however, to discover any organic basis for the trouble. That such a person is suffering from occupational neurosis seems evident enough from the circumstances involved. It well may be that at the outset he consciously made up his mind to perform the work, because on economic grounds it was imperative for him to do so; but in spite of such a resolution, an unconscious rebellion against such an occupation gradually became stronger and stronger, ultimately manifesting itself in the form of a somatic complaint. Sometimes a change of occupation is in itself sufficient to send the individual off in the direction of recovery. In certain of its aspects, occupational neurosis strikes one as being akin both to hysteria and to neurasthenia. In my opinion, the occupational neurosis occurs with some frequency amongst persons who are forced into kinds of work for which they are totally unsuited both by temperament and by natural inclination.

Strecker and Ebaugh have defined *hypochondriasis* as "a chronic complaint-habit." These same authors go on to say: "It may arise from a variety of sources. Imitation of observed adult patterns, the desire to retain privileges derived during a period of actual illness, unhappiness at home or at school, ill-treatment, overwork with no recreational outlets, solitary life, parental over-solicitude, feeling of insecurity, medical

mismanagement, and fear of punishment may all contribute to the development of a somatic complaint on a psychogenic basis." This quotation, taken from the authors' *Practical Clinical Psychiatry*, I consider to present the matter in very satisfactory terms.

An illustration I have in mind will serve to show how hypochondriasis may be made the expression of some particular complex residing and operating exclusively in the realm of the unconscious. If an individual harbouring an unconscious fear of incest or venereal disease complains of a disorder in the genito-urinary tract, we are justified, on Freudian grounds, in assuming that the somatic complaint has come into being only because of an unconscious psychic process, and that the individual in question is really suffering, not from any actual physical disorder in the genito-urinary region, but simply from a form of hypochondriasis. Like neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis, this is, in Freud's view, an "actual neurosis." Where hypochondriasis is concerned, solicitude about one's physical well-being is apt to be more pronounced than it is in either conversion hysteria or occupational neurosis. If in everyday life we meet with an individual who is chronically and needlessly concerned about his health, we call him a *hypochondriac*.

There are, of course, all sorts of "phobias" and "manias" which take on a neurotic colouring as soon as they arrive at a certain stage of exaggeration or dis-

proportion. Impressive-sounding Greek names have been given to all of the more common phobias. Even amongst relatively well-balanced people, we may encounter such reactions as a fear of high places, a fear of being shut in, a fear of darkness, and so on. Unless such phobias become excessive or compulsive, they need not, I think, occasion us any grave concern.

From what has been said in this chapter about the nature of neurosis, it can very reasonably be deduced that even a disorder of obviously psychogenic origin is capable of causing functional disturbances in the individual's somatic apparatus. Thanks to what Freud and others have taught us about the neurotic personality, we are in a better position than ever before to grasp how intimate, after all, is the relation existing between psyche and soma. If in this rather sketchy description of some important aspects of neurotic behaviour I have only hinted at the true extent of such a connection, then I may enjoy the satisfaction of knowing that my efforts have not been completely in vain.

CHAPTER IX

The Question of Psychosis

*Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased,
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And with some sweet oblivious antidote
Cleanse the puffed bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart?*

—SHAKESPEARE

IF FROM THE PRECEDING CHAPTER IT HAS BEEN CON-
cluded that neurosis, save in its more severe forms,
seldom affects anything equivalent to a thoroughgoing
disorganization of psychic processes, or renders the
individual completely incapable of accommodating
himself to his environment or to the usual demands of
everyday life, then surely the deduction is a valid one.
On this point I should like, in fact, to give reassurance
of a somewhat emphatic kind. It is not to be doubted
that many a person who goes through life harbouring
a neurosis of one sort or another is able, in spite of
this circumstance, to lead an otherwise happy and even
useful existence. Many neurotics not only succeed
well enough in the professions of their choice but also
make themselves socially desirable citizens. It is not
too much, indeed, to say that we find neurotically dis-
posed individuals in all occupations and in all theatres
of endeavour. Some of them are clearly if not pain-
fully conscious of their difficulties; others manage to
give us the impression that they are blissfully unaware
of being different from other people. For this reason

I have been led to speak of "aware" and "unaware" neurotics.

Now we shall focus our attention upon the subject of psychosis. First of all, however, I should like to say that to differentiate precisely between psychosis and psychoneurosis is not always a facile task. For instance: Charcot considered hysteria to be a psychosis, whereas Freud has invariably regarded it as a psychoneurosis. If the difference between normal behaviour and neurotic behaviour be, after all, as Ernest Jones has assured us, a quantitative rather than qualitative matter, then I can see no reason why the same general view may not be embraced where the difference between neurotic behaviour and psychotic behaviour is concerned. For psychosis is, to all intents and purposes, merely an exaggerated or intensified form of neurosis. As such, it is naturally more damaging to the personality, and it is more disrupting to the various phases of an individual's self-adaptation—social, religious, ethical, occupational, domestic, etc. Since in my remarks concerning the subject I should prefer to avoid the jarring effect a word like "insanity" or a phrase like "mental disease" usually has upon a person, and since it is necessary now to establish just what we are going to understand by the term "psychosis," let us say simply that we have to do here with a species of psychic disturbance more serious than neurosis.

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In the present chapter I shall restrict my consideration to those psychoses for which, as a rule, no anatomical basis is discoverable. In other words, psychoses which apparently rest upon an organic foundation will be considered definitely outside the scope of this chapter.

Now the question may well be asked: What is the cause of psychosis? Because we have concluded already that psychosis is a disorder of the psyche, we shall best understand its symptoms and its manifestations in terms of psychopathology; and perhaps we are safe in advancing—at least as a mere generalization—the hypothesis that such a disorder appears in many instances to be an outgrowth of particular personality traits or characterological peculiarities with which the individual is endowed. We cannot ignore entirely, however, the fact that investigations conducted in recent years seem to indicate that hereditary and/or constitutional factors may not be without their rôle in the ætiology of psychosis. Whatever the cause may be, we are in a position now to state positively and definitely that such a disorder does not spring up overnight, like a mushroom growth, any more than does neurosis. Just as a physical malady—cancer, for example—has its own course of development, so has a psychic malady. We must understand it is by *evolution* rather than by *revolution* that such a condition as schizophrenia or paranoia makes its appearance.

Freud himself, with his customary astuteness, has recognized that the psychotic pattern is predetermined in accordance with certain basic characteristics of the personality. In a passage marked no less by felicity of phrase than by depth of insight, he compares psychotic symptoms to the fragments of a crystal which has been thrown upon the ground and broken. The limits of such fragments, according to him, were previously determined by the very structure of the crystal. Freud then goes on to say that psychotics resemble such fissured and splintered structures as these.

The psychoses to engage our attention here are those which are generally enumerated as the major functional ones: (1) *schizophrenia*, (2) *paranoia*, and (3) the *manic-depressive psychosis*. Let us deal with these, at least phenomenologically, in the same order in which I have enumerated them. In proceeding we shall discover, no doubt, that some of my observations concerning the neurosis apply with equal pertinence to the present topic.

The very etymology of the word *schizophrenia* conveys to us the idea of a split intellect or split personality. Whatever hereditary or constitutional factors may warrant or deserve consideration, it is generally agreed today that schizophrenia evolves out of a particular set of character or personality traits. These traits of character or personality constitute the kind of temperament which has come to be designated

as *schizoidism*. *Dementia præcox* is the term by which the world originally knew schizophrenia, and it is plain enough that the term still enjoys some currency in much of the scientific literature on the subject. To Bleuler, the eminent Swiss psychiatrist (1857-1939), we are indebted for the introduction of the word *schizophrenia*. In offering this more recent term to scientific circles, Bleuler¹ has remarked: "As the disease need not progress as far as dementia and does not always appear *præcociter*, i.e., during puberty or soon after, I prefer the name *schizophrenia*."

The individual who is profoundly and intensely introverted, who prefers to shun society and live largely within himself, and who finds it difficult if not impossible to deal successfully with his fellow-creatures, is known as a *schizoid* type. Such traits as these the schizoid child may evince at a very early age. If, at the time of puberty or a slightly later period, they should become sufficiently pronounced, exaggerated, or intensified, a schizophrenic condition of greater or lesser proportions is thought to exist. But though schizophrenia is undoubtedly often associated with puberty, it may actually occur during almost any other period of the individual's life. Moreover, the transition from schizoidism to schizophrenia may be so nebulous as to permit of no precise delimitation. As Bleuler him-

¹Bleuler, Eugen: *Textbook of Psychiatry*. Translated by A. A. Brill, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924.

self¹ has said: "At what stage of the anomaly anyone should be designated as a 'schizoid' psychopath, or as a schizophrenic mentally diseased, cannot at all be decided as yet."

The schizoid, having his interests concentrated within himself, becomes, as we say, cut off from his environment. Unable or unwilling to face the conditions of average life, he gradually constructs a world of his own—a world which indeed has very little in common with objective reality. Thus we detect in such a person a sort of abstraction, a dreamy attitude of mind, an excessive fondness for solitude, an equally pronounced disinclination to activity, and a continual indulgence in day-dreaming. As Freud would say, the schizoid seems to be perpetually *regressing* to some earlier stage of his mental and emotional development.

Let us not, however, form a premature conclusion by assuming that every schizoid is bound to become schizophrenic after a while, for such is by no means invariably the case. It is a fact that some schizoids, despite a certain tendency towards a disintegration of the personality, manage to adjust themselves to their environment, and even to the outside world, by learning, perhaps, that reality, after all, is not quite so harsh or forbidding as it may have seemed to them. We should err, nevertheless, in supposing that such individuals do not remain profoundly introverted, or do

¹*Ibid.*

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not continue to have a great many of their interests inextricably bound up with themselves. Such introversion as we find in the schizoid temperament is likely to operate as a constant mode of reaction throughout the individual's life.

Schizophrenia is itself divided into four forms, which we enumerate as (1) the *simple*, (2) the *hebephrenic*, (3) the *catatonic*, and (4) the *paranoid*. In those instances where we are able to observe the presence of mixed symptoms, we establish diagnosis on the basis of such symptoms as are most pronounced.

In *simple schizophrenia* we find the syndrome (i.e., a group of symptoms pointing towards a disorder of some particular kind) in its most elemental, most fundamental form. The individual's behaviour is marked principally by a withdrawal from reality and a retreat into his own little world; and by a greater or lesser degree of physical and psychic lassitude. In addition to such symptoms as these, there is a general tendency in the direction of regression.

The *hebephrenic* form of schizophrenia is characterized by silliness and giggling, bisexuality, cosmic identification, and various delusions of grandeur and power. The mental mechanism known as *dissociation* is also likely to operate extensively in hebephrenia. Here the mechanism finds its expression, for instance, in the separation of ideas from the effects rationally consistent with them. A hebephrenic patient, to men-

tion a single example, laughed loudly and heartily as he made the remark that he was being cut into millions of pieces. By means of identifying himself with the cosmos, the hebephrenic may also come to believe that he is the ruler of the universe; that all cosmic functions operate according to his will alone; that he knows all and comprehends all. *Silly dementia* is a name by which hebephrenia has sometimes been known.

Catatonic schizophrenia is itself sub-divided into two distinct forms: *catatonic stupor* and *catatonic excitement*. In catatonic stupor, the schizophrenic's tendency is to be as little active as possible. Such utter inactivity on his part may be regarded, perhaps, as his own method of expressing impulses or reactions of a negativistic character. Manifesting a statuelike immobility, the individual with catatonic stupor remains in a single attitude for an indefinite period, apparently taking not the faintest interest in what goes on about him. A more striking picture of complete indifference, one could not readily imagine. There is, moreover, a complete lack of concern about personal habits; hence it is not uncommon to find that the discharging of urine and faeces may be delayed unduly, or else may take place without the individual's altering his attitude. In catatonic excitement, on the other hand, we observe a strikingly different picture. The person affected is decidedly overactive; his behaviour may in

general make us think of the behaviour of someone suffering a manic attack of the manic-depressive psychosis; and instead of withholding his urine and fæces, he may childishly discharge them upon the floor. Such an abundance of activity as we detect in cases of catatonic excitement may possibly be considered a misdirected expression of a positivistic attitude.

Paranoid schizophrenia is thus designated because, though the syndrome points more decisively towards schizophrenia, it bears a similarity to paranoia proper. By this I mean to say that certain symptoms associated with paranoia—i.e., delusions and hallucinations—are unmistakably observed among persons who are victims of this form of schizophrenia. The paranoid schizophrenic conceives all sorts of bizarre notions about the machinations of his "enemies." He maintains that he is constantly and perpetually persecuted by them. Numerous and intensely varied, indeed, are the ways in which they endeavour to effect his degradation. As the disorder progresses, however, the ideas of persecution may be displaced by delusions of greatness or omnipotence: the patient may even, for instance, conceive the notion that he is Christ or God.

Before proceeding to a description of the *modus operandi* of paranoia itself, I should like to point out that psychologists and psychiatrists employ today the expression *paranoid conditions* in order to designate certain states which, to all intents and purposes, oc-

cupy a position somewhere between paranoia proper and the paranoid form of schizophrenia. Obviously such a convenient phrase is diagnostically serviceable in enabling us to designate with some measure of precision states or symptoms which, strictly speaking, belong neither to paranoia proper nor to the paranoid form of schizophrenia. In default of such a term we might, indeed, find it a difficult matter to establish an appropriate distinction between the two nosologically differentiated syndromes.

Now the question may well be asked: Just what is the difference between paranoia itself and the paranoid form of schizophrenia? It seems to be this: that in paranoia the ideas of persecution and the delusions of greatness are better systematized; that they appear—if one may employ such an expression—more logical. These ideas and delusions may, indeed, affect only a part of the individual's mentality, though with the passing of time they are likely to expand the scope of their activity and influence.

Krafft-Ebing, in his classical work, has mentioned two principal types of paranoia: (1) *original paranoia*, which is of hereditary origin, and which develops before puberty or at puberty; and (2) *acquired paranoia*, a form which appears at some later period, especially during the involution stage of life.

We have learned that delusions and hallucinations are major symptoms of paranoia. The paranoiac is sub-

ject to delusions of both persecution and grandeur. A somewhat regular alternation of such delusions is by no means uncommon. The paranoiac insists emphatically—sometimes very emphatically—that he has bitter enemies who are perpetually scheming and plotting to bring about his downfall. Of general occurrence also are hallucinations. These are frequently of an auditory kind, the paranoiac alleging that he can hear the voices of his enemies as they attempt to degrade him.

A psychodynamic view of paranoia may be intensely illuminating, in that it reveals the extent to which paranoiacs are accustomed to employ the mental mechanism known as *projection*, and reveals also the homosexual component so often discoverable in the disorder. In the third volume of his *Collected Papers*, Freud has discussed at some length an intensely interesting case of paranoia in which the individual, to keep homosexual wish-fantasies at bay, reacted in this way: he developed the delusion that persons of the same sex had been approaching him with sexual activity in view. By no means is it unusual for a paranoiac to assert in vigorous and emphatic terms that someone is endeavouring, or has endeavoured, to lure him into homosexual practices. Only recently I have myself met with a rather illuminating paper in which the author mentions one hundred twenty cases of paranoia in which a pronounced homosexual content

has been observed. Because of the frequency with which paranoia is associated with homosexual tendencies, Ferenczi has gone so far as to term the former "distorted homosexuality." It is not to be assumed, however, that paranoia invariably has a homosexual component, any more than it is to be assumed that homosexuality invariably manifests a paranoiac one.

As a result of the extent to which they have managed to systematize their delusions of persecution and grandeur, many paranoiacs seem to go through life without ever coming under the observation of psychologist or psychiatrist. For their families and their acquaintances, such persons must constitute a source of considerable annoyance and perplexity; and it is well known, moreover, that in courts of law they frequently enough make themselves heard as they energetically and dogmatically set forth their grievances. Ostensibly never doubting the validity or tenability of their own claims, paranoiacs no doubt would resist rather fiercely any psychotherapeutic measure which might be suggested to them; and should a practitioner attempt to treat them against their will, the very life of that practitioner, as Hinselwood has pointed out, might well be in danger. Some forms of paranoia are, of course, periodic rather than continuous, so that free intervals exist in which treatment might be administered were it possible to convince the paranoiac that he harboured a susceptibility to this type of mental

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illness. Perhaps the problems of paranoia are yet to be solved, or at least reduced, by future investigations and experiments.

Let us focus our attention now upon a consideration of some phenomena involved in the *manic-depressive psychosis*. It is to the everlasting credit of Emil Kraepelin that he has been able sharply and decisively to separate this psychosis from all forms of schizophrenia and thus to render the psychosis nosologically independent. That, in spite of Kraepelin's contribution to our knowledge, the one psychosis should still, by some people, be confounded with the other is perhaps not unnatural for those who are not highly skilled in matters of diagnosis; for, as Bleuler has pointed out, the symptoms of the manic-depressive psychosis can be observed in schizophrenia, though the more individualized symptoms of the latter do not exist in the former. Bleuler declares also that only long experience and a great deal of investigation will enable us positively to distinguish the one anomaly from the other.

For the greater part of what we know today about the manic-depressive psychosis in its psychoanalytical aspects, we are indebted principally to Sigmund Freud himself and to his distinguished disciple Karl Abraham. It was in 1911 that the latter published his first work on the subject. Since that time our knowledge has been broadened and enriched by additional con-

tributions. It is now thought that a variety of Freudian concepts (*introjection*, the *super-ego*, *anal-expulsive drives*, etc.) must operate in the ætiology of this psychosis. Here we shall concern ourselves mainly, however, with some speculation upon the extent to which the phenomenon appears to be an outgrowth of certain personality traits, and with a description of those symptoms by which we are enabled to recognize the manic-depressive psychosis as such. In the interest of differential diagnosis, I consider it very important that we make every effort to avoid confounding this disorder with any form of schizophrenia.

I should like to point out, first of all, that the very name of the psychosis is itself rather significant—perhaps more significant than either *schizophrenia* or *paranoia*. For does it not suggest to our minds a certain shifting of moods; an alternation of such states as excitement and dejection? We know that there are persons who possess what is called a *cyclothymic* or *cycloid* temperament. The emotional fluctuations of these persons may range from the most intense elation to the most acute despondency. Sometimes their affects alter so suddenly that we find ourselves wondering what can be the cause of such a change. Without any reason which is apparent to the observer, an individual with this species of temperament may leap from a state of intense gaiety to one of rather profound melancholy. It is worth mentioning that such

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beings as these are occasionally endowed with creative minds which enable them to distinguish themselves in artistic fields of endeavour. Moebius has expressed himself as believing that Goethe possessed such a temperament; Bleuler has not rejected the idea that von Kleist also was a cyclothymic, if indeed not a manic-depressive in some degree or other. Those who know the lives of such poets as Keats, Shelley, and Byron can scarcely doubt that all three of them appear to have experienced the very same emotional fluctuations which go hand in hand with this type of disposition. From this we are not to deduce, however, that a creative spirit like a poet or a musician is necessarily a mild manic-depressive; nor must we fall into the error of supposing that any person who manifests a cycloid disposition is bound to suffer eventually from the fully developed manic-depressive psychosis. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that complications sometimes occur which render it no less difficult for us to say precisely where cyclothymia ends and the manic-depressive psychosis begins, than it is for us to decide with absolute certainty just where schizoidism ends and schizophrenia begins. As is always the case where psychic disturbances are concerned, considerations of proportion must continue to assume a rather conspicuous importance.

I should like to mention the manic temperament itself, in contradistinction to the cyclothymic or cy-

cloid one. That we encounter this temperament from time to time in everyday life is scarcely to be doubted. Emil Kraepelin, whose talent for pure description is universally acknowledged even by those who look with small favour upon his general contributions to abnormal psychology, has given us a more than satisfactory exposition of those characteristics evinced by the individual whose behaviour manifests a manic tone. Kraepelin asserts that such persons generally possess mediocre intellectual capacities. Sometimes, however, they show higher mental endowments, and in isolated cases even excellent ones. But seldom enough are they inclined to apply themselves to anything for very long at a time, because they are markedly deficient in perseverance and in unity of purpose. In view of the extraordinary distractibility inherent in their natures, it becomes understandable why they should prefer not to bind themselves to the trammels of anything resembling systematic application. Instead, they may pursue a variety of side-occupations. Such an individual, according to Kraepelin, exhibits perpetually a mood which appears full of exaltation, recklessness, and assurance.

Now it is appropriate to consider the behaviour of one who possesses the opposite temperament; that is to say, the behaviour of one who is inclined to take an intensely gloomy view of life, and whose feeling of depression is so often entirely out of proportion to

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whatever is the apparent cause of that depression. In describing the mental attitude of such an individual, we are wont to employ, in everyday life, such expressions as "down in the dumps," "in low spirits," etc. Even as we thus describe the individual's attitude, we usually, I believe, have the feeling that there is scarcely any reason for his being so thoroughly dejected. Perhaps we may be led to say something like: "Cheer up; the world hasn't come to an end!" Hence we attribute too much importance to *external* influences, and too little importance to the fact that such a person, on account of his depression, has come to take a melancholy view of *himself*. When we realize the true origin of the mental attitude involved, it becomes plain to us that the ultimate cause of such depression must be ascribed *more* to internal influences and *less* to external ones.

We should be little justified in supposing that the manic-depressive psychosis consists of a regular alternation of manic and depressive moods. On the contrary, the one phase may from the very beginning be the more pronounced; or the manic phase, let us say, may last for some time before the depressive phase even makes its appearance. Like paranoia, the manic-depressive psychosis is likely to have its free intervals—intervals during which the individual suffers from neither manic nor depressive attacks. It is assumed that Mary Lamb, sister of the famous English essayist,

was a manic-depressive; and students of English literature will recall how her brother would always take her back to the asylum after the occurrence of a fresh attack. They will recall also that on the occasion of a particularly violent attack Mary Lamb took the life of her own mother. This has always struck me as one of the most poignant tragedies ever recorded in the history of English literature.

How does a manic-depressive behave in his manic moments? He is, for one thing, excessively cheerful: one feels that he has never had a grave worry in his life. So far from manifesting the lassitude of depression, he seems to be charged with an inexhaustible store of physical and psychic energy. In speech, as well as in action, he is completely uninhibited; nothing appears to disturb him. His euphoria positively bubbles. He dwells on no subject in particular, but rather leaps like lightning from one subject to another. The impulses of the id operate freely and wildly, the super-ego lays no restraining hand upon them, and of course the ego is temporarily incapacitated for the performance of its functions. In short, the patient seems not only happy but absolutely exultant.

Of a typical depressive attack Zilboorg, in a volume entitled *Psychoanalysis Today*, has given us a description which is so good and so vivid that I wish to reproduce it here:

"His depressive states were ushered in, in a char-

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acteristic manner: for a short time before, he would complain of 'crazy fantasies' which obsessed him: he would imagine himself all-powerful, upsetting the whole machinery of the stock market, and thus ruining his enemies, or he would imagine himself rushing into the printing shop, where he occasionally amused himself by setting up print, and strewing the type 'all over the place.' Gradually he would grow sadder, slower and more self-accusatory—thoughts of suicide would then begin to preoccupy him."¹

I regret that I cannot enter into Zilboorg's detailed analysis of this case. The analysis is nearly as illuminating as it is interesting.

In bringing to a close this sketchy account of the manic-depressive psychosis, I wish to point out that my aim has been merely to convey to those interested an adequate conception of the most obvious features inherent in this disturbance. Here, as in both schizophrenia and paranoia, there naturally are variations and complexities with which the scope of this work does not permit me to deal.

¹Quoted, by permission, from Zilboorg's essay in *Psychanalysis Today*, edited by Sandor Lorand. New York: International Universities Press, 1944.

CHAPTER X

The Scientific Interpretation of Dreams

*I dreamed of him last night, I saw his face
All radiant and unshadowed of distress . . .*

*And then methought outside a fast-locked gate
I mourned the loss of unrecorded words,
Forgotten tales and mysteries half said . . .*

—ALFRED DOUGLAS

ADVISEDLY I HAVE USED THE WORD "SCIENTIFIC" in the title of this chapter. I have done so in order to crase immediately from the reader's mind the possible impression that I cntertain any notion of occupying myself here with the merely *superstitious* interpretation of dreams. Formerly, as everybody remembers, it was a common practice to interpret dreams in accordance with their supposed power to forecast coming events. That today the practice still obtains to some extent is hardly to be doubted by anyone who has lived in any part of the United States where superstitions are in general more or less prevalent. If an ignorant person in the South dreams, for instance, that his mother has died, he harbours a grave fear for weeks or even months, believing implicitly that the dream has predicted the death of his mother. In spite of the fact that Alfred Adler has professed to discern in the dream a sort of anticipatory colouring, the general idea that dreams have any power for prognosticating future events has now been laid aside by most thoughtful persons in view of the scientific value which dreams are now considered to possess.

What is the origin of dream-interpretation as a rational scientific procedure? It is now upwards of forty years since Sigmund Freud published his immensely valuable work entitled *The Interpretation of Dreams*. According to Ferenczi, this work has proved to be the permanent foundation for Freud's subsequent contributions to the sum of psychoanalytical thought. It is true that an early investigator named Paul Näcke had insisted vigorously upon the importance of dreams in the diagnosis of constitutional homosexuality, and that Krafft-Ebing himself had not altogether ignored the subject of dreams. It remained, nevertheless, for Sigmund Freud, and none other, to offer to the world an appropriately detailed and integrated study of the dream and its functions.

Proceeding upon the hypothesis that the dream is "the royal road leading into the unconscious," Freud has studied in extensive and thorough fashion its numerous aspects, its widely varied manifestations. The notion early occurred to him—quite logically—that since during the hours of sleep the conscious mind is temporarily inactive, the unconscious might very well come to the fore, asserting—whether directly or indirectly—its own impulses and strivings. In other words, Freud has perceived that the dream is an intensely valuable if sometimes strangely distorted picture of the unconscious psychic apparatus. Upon this principle rest his copious investigations in the domain of dream-interpretation.

Speaking out of his own experience, Freud has postulated that there are two distinct elements which are to be found in the dream; namely, the *manifest content* and the *latent content*. The former is simply that part of the dream which lends itself more readily to analysis and interpretation; the latter is that medium through which we come to discover some repressed or suppressed psychic material. The *latent content*, in other words, proves to be a sort of camouflage for some repressed emotion or impulse. Stekel maintains that Freud has paid too much attention to the latent content and too little to the manifest content. Whether this opinion be well-founded is a matter we cannot undertake to discuss here. I should like to point out, however, that Stekel's own contributions to the technique of dream-interpretation will be mentioned elsewhere in this chapter.

Freud has never ceased to maintain in energetic terms that, whatever it may appear on the surface to be, the dream is in reality a *wish-fulfilment*—is necessarily and unalterably a wish-fulfilment, and nothing else. To grasp the full import of this concept, we shall have to accord very close attention to the *latent content*; and we shall also have to bear in mind perpetually the rather broad meaning with which Freud has seen fit to invest the word "wish." The sense in which he employs this word seems often as broad as the one in which he employs, for instance, such a word as

“sexual” or “sexuality.” To Freud a wish may mean, not only what it does to us, but also an impulse or a striving towards some particular end, or in some particular direction. To put the matter differently: where Freud is concerned, a wish by no means always exclusively occupies itself with the idea of something the execution or fulfilment of which would prove necessarily pleasant to the individual. If I have always doubted whether Freud gains anything of practical value by giving to the word “sexual” so broad a connotation, I suppose I may say the very same thing where his use of the word “wish” is concerned. Unless, however, we understand precisely what his own conception of a wish is, then we shall find it well-nigh impossible to grasp or accept his postulate that the dream must necessarily be a wish-fulfilment.

It is not unthinkable—at least not to me—that some considerable portion of the psychic material we repress or suppress for one reason or another during our waking hours should strive to express itself during sleep, while the conscious apparatus of the psyche is temporarily incapable of performing its functions. Nor is it unthinkable that a wish entertained, whether consciously or unconsciously, during the waking hours should strive by night to reap its fulfilment in a dream. Many a time one who by day has longed in vain for some experience has by night, in his dream, enjoyed the thrill and satisfaction of achieving that

same experience. I dare say all of us, without exception, can remember instances in which our dreams have served clearly and unmistakably as the fulfilments of wishes we have harboured. There is nothing remarkable about this; the experience, actually, is a quite common one. Perhaps at this point I may be permitted to digress slightly for the purpose of remarking that Freud has suffered a gross injustice at the hands of those who accuse him of ascribing to every dream a sexual significance. Those who have studied his works carefully and extensively are well aware that he has never done any such thing. Moreover, he himself has been at pains to deny emphatically the validity of this accusation.

In his epoch-making work Freud has not failed to study in copious detail the phenomenon now well known to us by the name of *dream-distortion*. Some dreams, as we all know, are so clear and so vivid as to permit of our recalling them with only a very slight amount of difficulty; others may undergo considerable distortion which causes their content to puzzle us, or which renders it difficult for us to recollect them after we awake. Such distortion Freud attributes to the presence of repressed psychic material. Were such material to appear in the dream in a completely undisguised form, it would prove painful or unacceptable to the dreamer. Consequently, a sort of censoring agent—in Freud's opinion, the preconscious—oper-

ates in the interest of preventing such an element from breaking into the individual's psychic mechanism without a disguise of some kind or other. This same censorship probably accounts also for the extreme difficulty we sometimes encounter in remembering certain dreams at all after we awake in the morning.

In his exhaustive investigation of dreams Freud lays appropriate stress upon the phenomenon of what he himself has termed *counter-wish-fulfilment*. A dream in which this agent operates is one which on the surface appears to be the very opposite of a wish-fulfilment. If we are to discover the wish-fulfilment itself, then we may be compelled to enter rather deeply into an analysis of the *latent content* involved. A young man dreams, for instance, that his mother has just died, and that he is beating his hands in spiritual agony. Does the manifest content of this dream suggest anything in the nature of a wish-fulfilment? Scarcely. But it well may be that at some time in the past, in a moment of acute anger or irritation, the young man in question has momentarily wished his mother dead; so that the agony he now experiences at her death in the dream may in reality be the fulfilment of an unconscious need or desire on his part for some sort of punishment. Thus, following Freud's technique of interpretation, we find that such a dream emerges, after all, as the fulfilment of a wish.

The subject of *dream-symbolism* is indeed one

which shows many widely varied aspects and ramifications. Sometimes dream-symbolism is very obvious; at other times it is intensely obscure. A pointed instrument, for example, may symbolize the male genital organ; a king or an emperor may symbolize high authority, or at least authority which transcends the dreamer's own. One must admit that it takes an extensive and rather intimate knowledge of the dreamer's life, his personality structure, and his psychic conflicts to enable us to make rational associations where matters of dream-symbolism are concerned. By way of emphasizing a point, I wish to repeat that this whole subject is one which has numerous aspects and which is capable of various ramifications and extensions; and I wish to add that determining the significance of any particular dream-symbol may, in the ultimate analysis, have to be a purely arbitrary procedure.

It is interesting to note that in his *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*¹ Freud formulates three rules which he believes should be followed in the process of dream-interpretation. The following are the three rules:

1. We are not to trouble about the surface meaning of the dream, whether it be reasonable or absurd, clear or confused; in no case does it constitute the unconscious thoughts we are seeking. (An obvious limitation of this rule will force itself upon us later.)

¹Translated by Joan Riviere. New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1920.

2. We are to confine our work to calling up substitute-ideas for every element and not to ponder over them and try to see whether they contain something which fits in, nor to trouble ourselves about how far they are taking us from the dream-element.

3. We must wait until the hidden unconscious thoughts which we are seeking appear of their own accord, just as in the case of the missing word "Monaco" in the experiment which I described.

Here, in order to convey a clearer idea of the actual procedures involved in dream-interpretation, I shall quote a dream from Freud's *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*¹ and then reproduce his own interpretation of it. The following dream is one that a young lady related to him:

An officer with a red cap was pursuing her in the street. She fled from him and ran up the staircase, with him after her. Breathless, she reached her rooms and slammed and locked the door behind her. The man remained outside and, peeping through the keyhole in the door, she saw him sitting on a bench outside, weeping.

Freud's interpretation follows:

In the pursuit by the officer with the red cap and the breathless climbing of the stairs you will recognize the representation of the sexual act. That the dreamer

¹*Ibid.*

shuts her pursuer out may serve as an example of the device of inversion so frequently employed in dreams, for in reality it was the man who withdrew before the completion of the sexual act. In the same way, she has projected her own feeling of grief on to her partner, for it is he who weeps in the dream, his tears at the same time alluding to the seminal fluid.

It should be noted how the mental mechanism of *projection*, which I have described in the third chapter, operates in this dream. It should be noted also how, by the mechanism of *symbolization*, also described in the third chapter, a sort of association is established between the idea of tears and that of seminal fluid.

Alfred Adler's view of the dream differs perceptibly from Freud's, in that Adler, instead of regarding it as an undoubted wish-fulfilment, attributes to the dream an anticipatory or even prescient character. To Adler the dream is anticipatory, however, not in a purely general way, but only in relation to the dreamer's own life-pattern. He believes that in analysing the dreams of a neurotic, for instance, we can discern a foreshadowing of some future thing which is more or less directly connected with the individual's own struggles or conflicts. Perhaps, according to Adler, the dream endeavours to evolve a means of

resolving some problem with which the dreamer is forced to cope because of the present pattern of his life. Freud himself, indeed, has mentioned a kind of dream which *appears* to have an anticipatory significance, but which, in his view, proves upon closer scrutiny and analysis to be merely a wish-fulfilment. For instance: *a lady goes to the opera-house to purchase a ticket for a musical concert which is to be presented there at some later time. That night she dreams that she is attending the concert.* Freud does not regard such a dream as having any truly anticipatory content. The lady, having already purchased her ticket, has every reason to believe that she will actually attend the concert; it happens simply that before the concert is given she experiences in her dream a fulfilment of her wish to attend it. Thus, if we accept the Freudian point of view, a dream of this character proves, in the ultimate analysis, to be a simple wish-fulfilment.

In general, Jung's concept of the dream differs no less from Alfred Adler's than it does from Freud's. Jung sees as the function of the dream the reflection of certain basic trends or tendencies of the personality. Such trends or tendencies, in his view, may have meanings which extend over the whole of life; or perhaps meanings which are invested with but a momentary significance. Jung declares, moreover, that the dream is capable of giving us an objective statement of these

trends or tendencies, whatever they may be; and that such a statement may concern itself very little, if at all, with perfectly conscious wishes, impulses, or convictions. He believes, too, that dreams exhibit a content which has power to serve as a corrective to one's conscious attitude. Thus Jung feels justified in attributing to the unconscious a more or less definite *compensatory function*. As for the *roots* of the dream, this noted psychologist considers them to exist partially in the conscious contents—that is to say, impressions formed during the preceding day, and remnants persisting from the current day—and partially in certain contents of the unconscious. These, Jung postulates, can emanate either from conscious contents or from spontaneous processes partaking of an unconscious character.

Jung deserves special credit, one may say, for having introduced into the science of dream-interpretation the valuable concept of *conditionalism*. This concept, stated in everyday language, can be expressed as follows: Under conditions or circumstances of such and such a kind, dreams of such and such a kind can and actually do occur.

Very interesting, too, are Stekel's more recent views on the dream and his more recent contributions to dream analysis and interpretation. Stekel proceeds on the hypothesis that the dream may be a wish-film but is not necessarily any such thing. He en-

deavours to analyse the manifest content no less closely or carefully than the latent content, complaining that Freud, whose disciple he originally was, has been inclined to lay too much emphasis upon the latter, or at least not to accord due consideration to the former.

Stekel, moreover, has studied dream processes and mechanisms very closely, not to say exhaustively, in their relation to the symptoms and manifestations of *parapathy*, *paralogia*, and *paraphilia*. These terms he employs regularly to denote, respectively, the neurosis, the psychosis, and the sexual perversion. Unfortunately, I cannot undertake to enter here into the interesting and quite plausible considerations upon which his preference for these terms is based.

Perhaps a special service which this competent if sometimes erratic investigator has rendered us lies in his recognition of the necessity for taking into account the question of repressed religious impulses. He maintains that some dreams denote as clearly a repression of religious emotions as others do a repression of sexual desires and instincts. On the whole, Stekel's labours and investigations in the province of dream analysis and interpretation have not failed to bear fruit; it is my own opinion, in fact, that his contributions are richer, more varied, and generally more valuable than those attributable to any one of Freud's more orthodox disciples.

CHAPTER XI

History and Theory of Psychoanalytic Therapy

*You scratch my surface with your pin,
You stroke me smooth with hushing breath:
Nay pierce, nay probe, nay dig within,
Probe my quick core and sound my depth . . .*

—CHRISTINA ROSSETTI

AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THIS CHAPTER, in order to forestall any possible misunderstanding, I should like to point out that today we use the term *psychoanalysis* to designate not only a specific therapeutic procedure but also the complete system of thought embodied in the various concepts evolved by Sigmund Freud and his followers.

The development of psychoanalysis as a rational and ever-growing science has been marked thus far by certain vicissitudes as well as by a number of unqualified triumphs. Even today, in some of the more reputable circles, there is some amount of prejudice against it; and more than a few of the official textbooks of psychiatry continue to dismiss the subject without anything approaching exhaustive consideration. But whatever may be the prejudices, whatever may be the limitations necessarily imposed upon psychoanalysis by the very nature or structure of the method, we can no longer deny, if our minds be open to reason, that this science of the human psyche is established beyond doubt all over the civilized world, and that its influence has spread even into various do-

mains of thought and various spheres of activity which are far removed, to say the very least, from traditional medicine or psychiatry. In art and literature, for instance, we can easily enough observe the extent to which Sigmund Freud's concepts have made themselves felt: poets, novelists, and playwrights have all drunk freely from the fount of knowledge which the genius of Freud has made available to the world at large. Except for Sigmund Freud, one doubts very much whether any such thing as the surrealist movement in art or poetry would ever have originated; one doubts, too, whether the "stream-of-consciousness" idea would have invaded the field of creative writing. One may mention particularly the influence which psychoanalytical thought seems to have exerted upon such literary figures as Joyce, Thomas, Lawrence, Mann, Kafka, Anderson, Frank, Aiken, Lewisohn, and Miller. To make such admissions as these is but to give Sigmund Freud his due. In short, psychoanalysis has become a part of our culture, our civilization. Today even the merest layman, *mirabile dictu*, has some knowledge or conception of what Freud means.

The nucleus of psychoanalysis, the germ of an idea which was destined to be expanded and developed into a system of thought, Sigmund Freud first conceived when his friend Josef Breuer, a gifted Viennese physician, informed him of the success he, Breuer, had

enjoyed from 1880 to 1882 in the treatment of a young woman with such hysterical symptoms as paralyses, inhibitions, states of mental confusion, etc. During the period of treatment, Breuer discovered by accident that if he allowed the young woman to relate to him, while she was under the influence of hypnosis, whatever was bothering her, she appeared to gain some relief from the disturbances and to take a more wholesome view of herself and her situation. The symptoms, which to all intents and purposes were of psychogenic origin, had apparently made their onset during a time of this young woman's tending, with much care and devotion, her ailing father. Such an opportunity to talk to her physician so freely about herself seemed to have upon the young woman the effect of a species of catharsis; so that Breuer's discovery, which of course contained the very germs of psychoanalysis itself, was destined to become known as the "cathartic method." It seemed to serve the purpose of a kind of catharsis, because it enabled a young woman with hysterical symptoms to purge herself emotionally.

Struck by what Breuer had learned from his hypnotic experiment with this same young woman, Freud became profoundly interested; and accordingly, with the same inquisitive mind and the same spirit of scientific independence which he was to manifest throughout his career, he began to investigate the potential-

ities he deemed to be inherent in the so-called "cathartic method." At that time he had already been at Charcot's famous clinic in Paris, absorbing the renowned master's views on hypnosis and hysteria (Charcot, let it be said in this place, had professed to see quite an intimate relation between the two states). With the passing of time, however, Freud had found himself growing less and less satisfied with the results of the hypnotic technique, if only for the reason that not all persons manifesting neurotic symptoms could be hypnotized. Thus, discarding the use of hypnosis, Freud was then to commence his extension and development of Breuer's cathartic method, and ultimately to evolve a sort of technique which should enable the patient to remain in complete possession of his faculties, and to think, speak, and act with unhampered freedom of will. It is quite understandable that at first he should have wondered what he might do to compensate for the "widening of consciousness such as is found in hypnosis"; for this widening of consciousness served an advantageous purpose in enabling the patient to recall things which had happened in the very earliest years of his life. He then came to the conclusion that what he designated as *free association* would, if developed in the proper degree, be no less beneficial to the patient. But in spite of Freud's early rejection of the hypnotic method, he has never, so far as I am aware, permitted himself to disparage or

discredit it. On the contrary, his undoubted debt to hypnotism has been acknowledged in eminently tactful language: "The importance of hypnotism for the history of the development of psychoanalysis must not be too lightly estimated. Both in theoretic as well as in therapeutic aspects, psychoanalysis is the administrator of the estate left by hypnotism."¹

Psychoanalytic therapy, as evolved and developed by Sigmund Freud, is now widely employed as a method of treatment in cases of nervous and psychic disorders. One of its major purposes is to enable the analysand to speak freely and intimately about his own psychic conflicts and difficulties. He should be hampered by no scruple, by no sense of restraint; rather, he should be encouraged to feel at liberty to mention whatever happens to come into his mind. Having already repressed too many of his affects and impulses, he should realize now the great importance of his forbearing to withhold a single detail, however trivial, childish, or obscene it may appear to him; for sometimes an apparently trivial, childish, or even obscene detail may be just the clue of which the analyst stands so sorely in need.

That, in addition to all else, there must be a general harmony between the personalities of analyst and analysand is a point which must be so obvious as hardly

¹Quoted from *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*. Translated by A. A. Brill. New York: Random House, 1938.

to deserve mention. In the interest of tangible or measurable results, it is particularly important also that the analysand should harbour no adverse reaction against the analyst, or against psychoanalysis in general.

During the procedure, the analysand generally lies in a comfortable position upon a couch, whilst the analyst sits on a chair behind him, just outside the range of his vision. By lying on a couch instead of sitting on a chair, the analysand begins more quickly to feel a sense of relaxation. He is therefore less liable to distraction of any kind, and he finds it considerably easier to give a free reign to his thoughts, his emotions, and his memories. For the duration of such a session, no third person is present. Thus we see that the consultation proceeds mostly in the fashion of an intimate conversation between two persons who are equally wakeful. Each of them remains free from all muscular tension or exertion, without being troubled by any distracting influence which might have a tendency to draw his attention from the activity of his own psyche.

It is in such a manner, then, that the analyst embarks upon his task of straightening out certain kinks which have somehow managed to clog up the analysand's mental or emotional machinery.

By facing the experiences or conflicts which have given rise to his present symptoms, and by describing them in copious detail and with appropriate elabora-

tion, the analysand accomplishes for himself what we know as *abreaction*. In other words, he gains the relief which come from the releasing of pent-up emotions and impulses; and thus he helps to set himself free from their deleterious effects.

Of further assistance to the analysand is the fact that he has begun to enjoy the confidence and sympathetic understanding of one who possesses some insight into his problems. The principle involved here is fundamentally a simple one; we find it embodied in such a bromide, for instance, as the one which tells us: "Confession is good for the soul." In the course of our everyday lives we have all of us observed again and again how soothing and relaxing it is to have the opportunity of unburdening ourselves completely to some intimate friend who will listen patiently and sympathetically. After such an experience as this (which in itself is really a sort of catharsis), we may even be able to see things in an entirely different light, or from an entirely different point of view.

As the psychoanalytical sessions progress, the analysand begins to see for himself the relation between present symptoms and past experiences; and with the skilful aid of the analyst he may well learn to make a number of associations for himself. The same may be said regarding the interpretation of dreams—a process which is extremely important in the psychoanalytical form of therapy. It is never enough for the ana-

lyst himself to interpret a dream, however skilled he may be in the technique: the connection between that dream and the analysand's own conflict must be made abundantly clear to the analysand. Otherwise the interpretation of a dream, like the forming of an association, may serve no particularly useful purpose.

In some psychoanalytical sessions there may develop what we have come to describe as a *transference situation*. By this concept we understand that the analysand, having found so much sympathy and understanding in the analyst, begins to transfer to the latter a number of his more intimate impulses and emotions, and to rely too much in general upon the analyst. Sometimes the analysand may go even so far as to conceive of the analyst as a possible love-object. Such a thing as this is perhaps especially apt to occur where analyst and analysand are of different sexes and the latter's amatory life is known to be extremely unsatisfactory.

In dealing with any kind of transference situation, whether it be slight or serious, the analyst must depend upon his own tact and good judgement. True, the fundamental principles of psychoanalytic therapy are standardized to some extent, though surely not to such an extent as to preclude the possibility of an analyst's exercising his own initiative or expressing his own individuality. In this respect, psychoanalytical technique may be likened, I think, to the art of

pedagogy: two instructors or professors may teach the very same subject, and yet not proceed in exactly the same fashion. For psychoanalysis is, first and last, a growing science, not a static one.

"How long a time do psychoanalytical sessions require?" is a question frequently asked by students of psychology, as well as by many a layman with whom I happen to be acquainted. To answer such a question with any degree of certainty or precision is impossible, because we know that the time required may very well range from six months to two or three years. The longer a neurotic symptom has existed, or the more severe such a symptom appears to be, the more time, naturally, will the analyst need, if he is to cope with it successfully. Of very considerable importance also is the attitude the analysand assumes towards treatment. If he realizes clearly that he is suffering from a psychic disturbance, and if he really desires to be set free from that disturbance, then it follows naturally that he will coöperate properly with the analyst, so that the latter's task becomes appreciably facilitated. But where active hostility or resistance exists—to say nothing of sheer prejudice—the removal of such a barrier may cost the analyst an enormous effort, requiring almost superhuman patience and perseverance. We must not forget that many an individual who receives psychoanalytical aid actually cherishes his neurosis by reason of the various advan-

tages it affords him—for example, solicitude on the part of the family, freedom from responsibility, sympathy from friends and acquaintances, etc. Psychoanalysis has enjoyed some marvellous successes in the treatment of transference neuroses like hysteria and obsessions; but thoroughgoing cures have not been effected overnight. Neuroses which are of a narcissistic character (i.e., incipient schizophrenia, paranoid conditions, etc.) have, on the other hand, not as yet proved amenable to this kind of therapy. It is by no means impossible, however, that psychoanalysis will eventually, as it continues to develop, find itself able to cope with such conditions more successfully than it is at present able to do.

It may not always be easy, of course, to judge definitely and positively at a particular time whether the analysand has reaped sufficient benefit or evinced enough improvement to render expedient a discontinuance of the sessions. In the absence of any invariable criteria, this matter, like so many others, must be left to the good sense and sound judgement of the individual analyst. Apart from whether the *specific* symptoms have disappeared which, in the first place, caused the individual to seek psychoanalytical guidance, a careful and thorough study of the analysand's *general* mental attitude towards himself and the world at large will prove of appreciable value; as will also any tangible evidence as to whether the dreams have begun to manifest a healthier complexion.

Born about half a century ago, psychoanalysis is still a young, vigorous, and growing science. It has already given much to the world; perhaps in time to come it will give even more. Such men as C. G. Jung and Alfred Adler, who were once so prominently connected with the psychoanalytical movement, have more recently evolved systems of their own and have won adherents for themselves all over the civilized world. The former is known for his *Analytical Psychology*; the latter for his *Comparative Individual Psychology*. On most points Jung and Adler differ from each other almost as much as they do from Freud. Whereas "the doctrine of repression and resistance, the recognition of infantile sexuality, and the interpreting and making use of dreams as a source of knowledge of the unconscious" may be said to constitute the main pillars upon which Freud's system rests, Jung has emphasized especially man's innate need for religious expression, and the concept of what he terms "psychic totality," believing that even the most drastically circumscribed neurotic conflict must be brought into focus with such totality. Adler, for his part, has given chief prominence to the idea of the neurotic's craving for mastery and superiority—in Nietzsche's classic phrase, "the will to power." To mention in detail the various points of departure involved in the systems of Jung and Adler is hardly feasible here, perhaps not even desirable, since my

purpose has been to deal in this chapter with the concepts of orthodox psychoanalysis rather than with those of Jungian or Adlerian psychology.

It is enough to say, in conclusion, that psychoanalysis, as we know it, promises to continue to go forward and to reveal fresh potentialities, because, as its gallant founder himself has believed, it represents a strong idea.

CHAPTER XII

How Internal Secretions May Affect Behaviour

*I will praise Thee; for I am fearfully and
wonderfully made.*

—PSALM 139:14

THAT THE SCIENCE OF ENDOCRINOLOGY HAS SHED fresh and valuable light upon certain sexual problems, as well as upon the general relation between sex and life, there can no longer be any doubt. This momentous and ever-expanding science is constantly helping us to understand not only the vagaries of psychosexual behaviour in general, but also the more intricate aspects of bisexuality and homosexuality. The experiments of many distinguished endocrinologists have shown in recent years that indeed all forms of sexual behaviour may be conditioned to a greater or lesser extent by the functions of an individual's glands of internal secretion.

The theory of internal secretions was first enunciated in the year 1889 by Charles Edouard Brown-Séquard, Professor of Physiology at the University of Paris. The renowned professor was at that time an old man: to be exact, he was seventy-two years of age. In a lecture in which he made known the effects of the injection of testicular extracts into himself, the elderly scientist stated: "The physiological effects of these injections will appear to you, as they appeared

to me, most surprising. It is sufficient to state that everything I had not been able to do or had done badly for several years on account of my advanced age I am today able to perform most admirably."¹

Was such optimism on the professor's part completely justified? Not in the opinion of the *Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift*, which observed: "Unfortunately the professor has been unable during the last years of his life to follow very closely the progress of science, and his fantastic experiments with testicular extracts must be regarded almost as senile aberrations."²

An equally unflattering view was uttered by the *Wiener medizinische Wochenschrift*.

Apparently both of these highly reputable journals overlooked the fact that Hippocrates, the father of medicine, had many centuries earlier suspected the existence in the human organism of certain "humours" (i.e., black bile, yellow bile, blood, and mucus) which he had thought to condition behaviour and to be responsible for various types of temperament. In a sense, Brown-Séquard's theory was not such a far cry from Hippocrates' own idea.

Just what do we mean by an *endocrine gland*? We mean simply one that secretes inwardly rather than

¹From *Sex and Life*, by Eugen Steinach. New York: The Viking Press, 1940.

²*Ibid.*

outwardly. Certain glands of the human body are known to have no ducts of their own for the discharging of their secretions, which are called "hormones"; consequently, they are compelled to discharge these secretions directly into the blood stream, by which the hormones are carried to all parts of the body. The ultimate mystery of these internal secretions, as they are called, has not been explained as yet, but it is only fair to add that a deeper, more satisfactory knowledge of such matters is constantly being acquired.

Though the endocrine glands operate in reciprocal fashion, each having a certain dependency upon, or relation to, the various others comprised in the system, there are two such glands which possess an especial importance for the student of abnormal psychology. These are the pituitary gland and the gonads. The latter are often designated as the sex-glands. These, then, are the glands which in this chapter we shall consider to the exclusion of the others.

The pituitary body, which is sometimes designated as the *hypophysis cerebri*, and which is deemed to possess a vast importance in the regulation of sexual processes, is a small gland—scarcely larger, indeed, than a hazelnut—located in the undersurface of the brain. Because of its proximity to the brain, we occasionally refer to the pituitary as the "brain index." This tremendously important gland is without any

external secretions whatsoever, though it appears to have quite a number of internal ones. In addition to activating the gonads and in a general way regulating sexual processes, the pituitary controls, among other things, the growth of the body. Hence we may conclude that giants and dwarfs alike suffer from a pituitary disturbance. In the absence of so vital a gland as this, the gonads themselves would be incapable of performing their functions. Removal of the pituitary body before the time of puberty would, according to scientific experiments, automatically preclude the possibility of such a thing as the appearance of puberty.

But though we know that the pituitary gland causes the germinal glands to become active, we seem to be still in the dark as to what it is that causes the pituitary to produce its own hormones.

The gonads—i.e., the testes in the male and the ovaries in the female—have external as well as internal secretions. Their external secretions serve the purposes of reproduction. In female mammals the ovoid bodies are found in the cavity of the abdomen. One lies on the right, the other on the left, of the uterus. In the male the homologous glands are likewise found in pairs; these, as I have mentioned, are known as testes, or testicles. Like the ovaries, the testes produce germ-cells, which are called spermatozoa, and which pass from the body by means of the urethral canal.

In the very early part of the present century, a brilliant young Viennese biologist named Otto Weininger published a truly remarkable book bearing the title *Sex and Character*. Whether or not Weininger himself even dimly imagined such a thing, this book was destined to carry his fame to all parts of the world. In his work Otto Weininger set forth the hypothesis that there is no such thing as the one-hundred-per-cent man; that such a being is at best only a product of the imagination. Nor is there, according to Weininger, any such thing as the complete woman. This very interesting writer goes on to explain that all people, without exception, contain within them both male and female elements. If the female elements predominate in a particular woman, then that woman is to be considered normal; and if the male ones predominate in a particular man, then that man is to be considered normal. In thus expounding such a theory of the relativity of sex, Weininger was—without being aware of the fact—a forerunner of such men, for instance, as Magnus Hirschfeld and Eugen Steinach. It is perhaps worth mentioning that although Weininger seems to have regarded this theory as his very own, no less a person than Darwin had suspected the existence of male and female *anlagen* in all people; and Wilhelm Heinse, in his *Ardingbello* (an English translation of which I have not been able as yet to find), had expressed himself as deeming it necessary

to assume the existence in Nature of both masculine and feminine elements. That man comes nearest to perfection, postulated Heinse, who is composed exclusively of masculine elements, and that woman comes nearest to perfection who has within her just enough feminine elements to enable her to remain a woman; whilst the man is worst who contains only so many masculine elements as to render it possible for him to qualify for the very title of man. Credit must be given to Iwan Bloch for the reason that in 1907 he was able to show that the substance of Weininger's famous hypothesis had already been uttered by Heinse in his *Ardinghello*. In justice to Weininger, however, we must acknowledge that it is entirely possible he never knew of Heinse's work.

But regardless of whether the postulate in question was originated by Weininger, by Darwin, or by Heinse the fact remains that it has had some rather striking confirmation in the experiments conducted by Eugen Steinach, the renowned Viennese biologist, whose *Sex and Life* first appeared in an English translation in the year 1940. By removing the ovaries from a female animal and by implanting a male sex-gland in the same animal, Steinach discovered that he had been able to alter the animal's whole psychosexual behaviour; and he noticed as well that the secondary sexual characteristics became gradually modified in a masculine direction. By removing the testes from a

male animal and implanting a female sex-gland, he observed a similar change of psychosexual behaviour and secondary sexual characteristics. A male animal, after such an operation, attempted even to suckle young. By implanting both male and female sex-glands in the bodies of animals rendered neuter through castration, Steinach has been able to create so-called "experimental hermaphrodites."

In view of the results of his numerous experiments, Steinach believes he has shown that psychosexual development and behaviour are controlled and regulated, not by nerves, but by glands. If this be true, then perhaps we have a right to expect much from the science of internal secretions in the way of future enlightenment about a variety of behaviour problems. We must remember that it was a physiologist who gave us the theory of conditioned reflexes—a theory which has proved so valuable from the purely psychological point of view. Incidentally, Pavlov's theory of schizophrenia strikes me as warranting more serious attention than it appears to have had.

Very interesting indeed is the endocrinological concept of homosexuality. Steinach himself specifically mentions the following types: (1) that form of homosexuality which expresses itself as a purely psychic condition deeply anchored in the brain; (2) a variety which, like the first, is congenital in character, but which is dependent upon the hormone-secreting

cells of both sexes; and (3) a form in which the homosexuality is not congenital but is rather manifested periodically throughout the individual's life. (To me it seems quite likely that this third form mentioned by Steinach may be merely the homosexual phase of constitutional bisexuality, and thus should not be confounded with genuine homosexuality.) Steinach¹ concludes: "To be sure, the ultimate reason why one individual becomes a physical hermaphrodite and another merely a psychic intermediate grade is still in the darkness. But it is not impossible that this problem too will be solved by future experiments."

Steinach reports also that in the year 1918 he "cured" a homosexual man through castration and the simultaneous implantation of an inguinal testicle. Regrettably, the complete details of this enormously interesting case are not available—at least not to English readers. In the absence of such details, one is forced to acknowledge that there is scarcely any means of ascertaining or determining whether the man in question was an absolute invert (Freud), or whether he was just *predominantly* homosexual, with perhaps a considerable bisexual component. It is easy enough to understand why the experiments which Steinach has performed with success upon animals might not be effective, generally speaking, in the case

¹Steinach, Eugen: *Sex and Life*. New York: The Viking Press, 1940.

of human beings, because of the highly developed nervous systems with which these latter are endowed. Steinach himself admits quite candidly that any operation the purpose of which is to "cure" deep-rooted sexual inversion should be followed by the application of psychoanalytical therapy.

In addition to the foregoing, Steinach believes that he has discovered female cells in the sexual glands of homosexual men. In commenting upon this, Hirschfeld—whom we must still take as the principal authority on homosexuality—writes as follows: "Steinach's belief—opposed by Benda and other investigators of interstitial tissues—that he has actually found female cells in the sex glands of homosexual men, seems to matter less to me than the fact, proved beyond doubt, that male, female, and intersexual constitutional types can be created at will by implanting certain sex-glands in diverse species of animals; in other words that, like the male and female sex type, the intersexual, in its varied stages, is dependent upon the gonads."¹

From statements made earlier in this same chapter, it can be deduced that the gonads themselves are, as we say, *sex-specific*. To grasp this idea completely, the reader has only to recall that by removing the ovaries

¹From Hirschfeld's essay on *Homosexuality* in *Encyclopaedia Sexualis*, edited by Victor Robinson. New York: Dingwall-Rock, Ltd., 1936.

from a female animal and implanting a male sex-gland in that animal, Steinach managed to produce a somewhat decided change not only in psychosexual behaviour but also in secondary sexual characteristics. It is precisely this sort of thing that we understand by the concept of sex-specificity. Such a principle does not hold true, however, where the pituitary is concerned, or any other gland in the endocrine system of man. In other words, it matters not one whit whether insulin administered to a male person has been obtained from the pancreas of a male or female animal: the result of the insulin is just the same.

It should be borne in mind also that hormones never appear unmixed in male or female individuals. The very fact that every constitution contains within it both male and female hormones is, after all, the most striking proof of the validity of the whole theory of relativity in the sexual sphere. The influence which these hormones exercise upon the individual sexual constitution is naturally determined by the proportions in which the hormones are compounded.

In comparatively recent years some notable advances have been made in the isolation of hormones. We know now, for instance, that in the urine are to be found two hormones. Where the male one is concerned, we speak of *testosterone*; where the female one is concerned, we speak of *estrogen* or *folliculin*. Testosterone, the masculinizing hormone, is manu-

factured in the testes themselves. The special hormone present in the urine of pregnant women is called *prolan*. In his description of the case of a twenty-five-year-old homosexual man, Abrahamsen reports that a hormonal investigation of the man's urine indicated that the amount of prolan was more than 56 Mouse Units, and the amount of estrogen more than 24 Mouse Units.

When the science of internal secretions has been developed to the fullest extent, and when all its rich potentialities have ultimately become translated into actualities, we shall have the satisfaction, no doubt, of adding to our ever-expanding chain of knowledge a large number of new and intensely valuable links.

CHAPTER XIII

Some Aspects of Criminal Psychology

*No puppet master pulls the strings on high,
Portioning our parts, the tinsel and the paint:
A twisted nerve, a ganglion gone awry,
Predestinates the sinner and the saint.*

*Each, held more firmly than by hempen band,
Slave of his entrails, struts across the scene;
The malnutrition of some obscure gland
Makes him a Ripper or the Nazarene.*

—GEORGE SYLVESTER VIERECK

THE SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR IS ONE which for a long time has engaged attention and engendered no inconsiderable amount of speculation and investigation. We should all like to know just what it is that makes a man a criminal. Is he a criminal because of heredity, or is he a criminal because of environment? Or are both forces operative, perhaps, where the manifestation of criminal proclivities is concerned? To neither of these questions have we as yet, regrettably, any definite, positive, absolutely unequivocal answer. We must therefore continue to wait for a while.

But today at least—thanks to the efforts of a number of careful investigators—we do know more about the criminal character than we have ever known before. Nor is it to be considered impossible that we shall learn more as we continue to study the criminal mind in its relation to both heredity and environment. The field of criminology is hardly less pregnant with potentialities than is the field of psychoanalysis or that of endocrinology. Here again we should be disposed,

I think, to assume an optimistic outlook rather than the opposite.

Before I offer any theories or speculations, I should like to make some reference to the man who founded modern criminal research as we know it today. That man was an Italian—by name Cesare Lombroso (1836-1909). Just as Richard von Krafft-Ebing was a great pioneer in the domain of *psychopathia sexualis*, so was Cesare Lombroso a great pioneer in the domain of criminal science.

In the year 1876 Lombroso published a pamphlet which was destined to become widely known, and to bring him a reputation as an investigator in the field of criminal research. To this pamphlet Lombroso gave the rather wordy title *The Criminal in Relation to Anthropological Jurisprudence and Psychiatry*. In it he set forth the hypothesis that the criminal was born with a particular kind of mind; that through his criminal tendencies and behaviour he merely expressed his own inner nature. This same pamphlet of Lombroso's was subsequently expanded into a work of three volumes which bore the title *Criminal Man*. For criminology, Lombroso's *Criminal Man* remains, perhaps, what Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis* does for sexology.

Though today we may feel no more disposed to accept Lombroso's theory of the born criminal than we are to accept his theory of the born prostitute—a

creature in whom Lombroso professed to discern anatomical deviations from type—yet we continue to be enormously indebted to this talented, energetic man for his scientific enquiry into the traits possessed by criminals, and the various causes of criminal behaviour.

In the year 1864, as an army physician, Lombroso enjoyed an excellent opportunity for studying the behaviour and reactions of men in military service. At about the same time he performed an autopsy upon a recently deceased notorious criminal in order to discover whether there were any possible somatic variations which might have some relation to the criminal tendencies the individual was known to have possessed. Convinced, as a result of the autopsy, that such somatic variations actually existed, Lombroso found his already susceptible imagination profoundly stirred, with the result that he produced a detailed description of these physical differences. In an instant he seemed to see luminously, as though it were a broad plain spread out beneath a resplendent sky, the whole problem of the criminal. To Lombroso, the criminal appeared as an atavistic individual who in his own person reproduced the predatory instincts of primitive man or even the lower animals. Thus the renowned criminologist thought himself able to explain, on anatomical grounds, the huge jaws, the high cheekbones, the conspicuous superciliary arches, the

solitary lines of the palms, the excessive size of the orbits, and such handle-shaped or sessile ears as might be found in criminals, savages, or apes. In addition to these phenomena, Lombroso discerned—or so he believed—a lack of sensitivity to pain, and an immoderately keen sight; to say nothing of a propensity to idleness or slothfulness, a burning passion for orgies of one kind or another, an uncontrollable longing to pursue evil for its own sake, and the ferocious impulse not only to destroy life in the victim, but also to mutilate the body, to lacerate the flesh, and to drink the blood like water.

If we are to base a judgement upon this very vivid and eloquent description, we shall conclude that Lombroso deemed himself able to detect quite a number of respects in which the criminal appeared to differ anatomically from the respectable, law-abiding citizen.

But in spite of the fact that Cesare Lombroso had an unmistakable flair for a certain kind of thoroughness, his mind was by no means incapable of wandering off in strangely unscientific and incongruous directions. For instance: Iwan Bloch tells us in *The Sexual Life of Our Time* that at the Sixth International Congress of Criminal Anthropologists, held in the city of Turin in May, 1906, Lombroso actually attempted to draw a parallel between congenital homosexuality and the congenital tendency to crime.

SOME ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY

In the same year Paul Näcke, himself a criminologist of no small note, showed luminously and conclusively that such a parallel does not exist save in a prejudiced intellect or an excited imagination. In spite of the fact that homosexuals do now and then come into conflict with the law, genuine homosexuality, as Näcke pointed out in 1906, has indeed strangely little in common with the genuine criminal disposition.

It is interesting to observe also that, according to Bloch, when Näcke desired for P. J. Moebius, the German neuropathologist and sexologist, a term by which to indicate on the one hand the man's unquestionable genius and on the other hand the shallowness and utterly theoretic nature of his scientific conclusions, he elected to call Moebius "the German Lombroso." Extreme as such a view on Näcke's part may appear to us, we must remember that the foregoing example concerning a supposed parallel between congenital homosexuality and the congenital tendency to crime argues how little some of Lombroso's ideas and hypotheses have been in accord with scientific findings.

In order to show further that Lombroso may well have been mistaken in his efforts to establish a causal connection between homosexuality and criminal tendency, I should like to mention some views expressed by Lindner in his more recent work, *Stone Walls and Men*—a book which indubitably marks a

significant advance in the truly scientific study of criminal behaviour, and which therefore ought to be recommended warmly to all readers interested in this vital subject. Lindner¹ writes on pp. 457 and 458:

"Like the confusion of alcoholism and crime, there is a similar confusion of homosexuality and crime. Homosexuality is not crime and has nothing whatsoever to do with it. Just as alcoholics may be criminotics, so some homosexuals may be criminotics. Homosexual behaviour has, however, been raised to the legal status of a statutory criminal act. *But homosexuals in prison are not necessarily criminals.* They are far more likely to be law-breakers."

This one passage from Lindner's work on criminology provides not only a striking confirmation of the view uttered by Paul Näcke as early as the year 1906, but also an additional proof of the fact that Lombroso was almost certainly in error when he endeavoured to draw a parallel between genuine homosexuality and the impulse to crime.

It is idle, no doubt, even to speculate upon whether heredity or environment is the more significant factor where the ætiology of criminal behaviour is concerned. The question is one which has been asked over and over again; and so far, to the best of my own knowledge, it has not as yet been answered satisfac-

¹Lindner, Robert M.: *Stone Walls and Men*. New York: The Odyssey Press, Inc., 1946.

torily in any way. Perhaps, indeed, it is fallacious to assume that either the one factor or the other is wholly responsible for the moulding of criminal tendencies. One would be considerably more justified, it seems, in assuming that a latent hereditary predisposition to crime might be aroused and made active by a particular combination of environmental influences; whereas under other circumstances that same predisposition might remain latent throughout the individual's life. This, in reality, is only an extension of the theory that even a pronounced inherited neurotic predisposition, for instance, may forever remain latent in the absence of some definite psychic or emotional conflict, or some specific traumatic experience, which might serve to awaken it and render it active. It is not an uncommon belief, in any event, that neurosis occurs chiefly in persons who are in some measure predisposed; and that the particular psychic conflict which comes to the surface is by no means the fundamental cause of the neurosis, but actually only the occasion. I do not know whether such a view as this would prove acceptable to the more orthodox Freudians.

Though we have seen that there can hardly be any basic causal connection between homosexuality and criminal behaviour, it is surely no secret that sexual deviates like sadists, for instance, may come into conflict with the law; for we are aware that such a condi-

tion as deep-rooted sadism might well find its acme in murder. Epileptics also may be legal offenders, having committed some sexual or other offense during the clouded states which are not uncommon to epilepsy. Among minor offenders, kleptomaniacs may be mentioned. Such persons, as a rule, steal only articles of small intrinsic worth; and it is not fantastic to assume that the majority of kleptomaniacs are, in reality, fetichists. Neurotics and psychotics are likewise found from time to time among persons exhibiting criminal proclivities. It is well known that the paranoiac, to mention but one psychotic type, can become violent on small provocation.

One should note particularly that criminal types are encountered with some frequency among so-called *psychopathic personalities*—a term by which we designate those rather numerous individuals whose symptoms are such as not to be assigned to any particular category of neurosis or psychosis. Eccentricity of manner and habits, freakishness of attire, and bizarre quirks of mental attitude are a few of the many characteristics by which we manage to recognize these psychopathic personalities. In addition, some of them are ethically and morally deficient, apparently devoid of all ability to differentiate between right and wrong; hence the criminal impulse or tendency observed in their cases. For a detailed and illuminating account of the complete hypnoanalysis of a criminal

psychopath, the student is advised to consult Robert M. Lindner's *Rebel Without a Cause*. (It occurs to me that the word *hypnoanalysis* may require some definition, since it has not as yet found its way into all medical or psychiatric dictionaries. By this term we now understand a form of therapy which combines psychoanalysis with an hypnotic technique.)

It is only fair to say that certain of the Freudian concepts appear to have found a place for themselves in the domain of present-day criminology. Broadly and roughly speaking, Freud's disciples impute criminal tendencies to a lack of development of the super-ego—that autonomously operative agent which enables the average human being to distinguish between right and wrong. The Freudians reason further that some people who commit crimes are those who may be prompted largely by purely unconscious motives of revenge or jealousy; that the committing of a crime may constitute for them a means of avenging themselves upon society for their own lack of opportunities, or for certain painful experiences to which they have been subjected at various times of their lives. Thus, by means of criminal activity, they manage to achieve what Alfred Adler terms "overcompensation."

Some Freudians have advanced also the theory that a criminal who leaves behind him a somewhat obvious clue is one who perhaps harbours an unconscious wish

or need for punishment. Such a concept has so hypothetical a cast that the likelihood of its being generally accepted among criminologists is not great.

Unlike the Freudians, Wulffen attributes all criminal conduct to disturbances of the inner secretions. In this connection, Wulffen's argument seems to run somewhat as follows: If various unhealthy reactions and impulses of other kinds can be evoked by a dysfunction of the endocrines, then why not criminal reactions and impulses? Just how much can be said against this view or in favour of it is problematical. At all events, I regret to find that, so far as I am aware, Wulffen's carefully written textbook, *Kriminalpsychologie*, published in Berlin in 1926, has not been translated as yet into English. It well may be that his views on criminal behaviour merit closer inspection, for Wulffen, like Gross, has enjoyed a high rank among German criminologists.

To me it seems prodigiously important that those whose duties and professions bring them into contact with criminal types should be at least moderately well-versed in the principles of abnormal psychology. For only when we understand thoroughly the numerous motives and vagaries of the criminal mind can we hope to begin doing anything really constructive towards the extirpation of this gnawing cancer in the social organism.

CHAPTER XIV

Phenomena of Epilepsy

The cause is secret, but the effect is known.

ADDISON

HAVING ALREADY GIVEN CONSIDERATION TO A large number of psychic disturbances and behaviour idiosyncrasies, we are ready now to turn our attention to what is surely one of the most mystifying phenomena in the entire field of abnormal psychology.

Even today the problem of epilepsy remains, at best, a baffling one. Its solution seems as difficult now as it has ever been in the past. We recognize epilepsy when we see it; we say: "Oh, yes, plainly a case of epilepsy . . ." But what do we do? Indeed, what *can* we do?

This phenomenon, like so many others, was known to the ancients. Hippocrates, the father of medicine, is supposed to have said of it that ignorance and wonder made it divine, but that in truth it was no more sacred than other diseases. At that time, we must remember, the custom was to regard such things as being somehow of divine origin.

Epilepsy is not considered a nosological entity, but a symptom—in the sense in which a headache, for instance, is a symptom. If there be any evidence of

its resting upon an organic foundation (for example, brain tumour or general paresis), than we speak of *idiopathic epilepsy*. Where no organic basis is discoverable, we speak of *symptomatic epilepsy*. While such a subdivision does not purport to be exact, it serves a diagnostic purpose.

The most striking feature of epilepsy is the attack proper. This is characterized by a sudden and violent convulsion, which commences on one side of the body, then begins to spread to the other. At first the convulsion is tonic; then it becomes clonic. The tonic phase of the epileptic attack consists of a series of muscular contractions; the clonic phase, of alternate contractions and relaxations of the muscles. The entire epileptic attack generally lasts for several minutes, to be followed by a profound coma.

As a rule, an attack of this kind is preceded by prodromata enduring for a few hours, or even a few days. Prodromal manifestations are apt to vary considerably, whether they appear as "moods" or as physical symptoms.

If a seizure be of the nature previously described, then the individual affected is said to suffer from *grand mal* epilepsy. There also occur *petit mal* attacks. These are marked by the loss of memory or of the consciousness of the person's surroundings. They last only a few seconds; in some cases, perhaps a minute or two. In differentiating between this kind of epilepti-

form seizure and the *grand mal*, Bleuler¹ says in his *Textbook of Psychiatry*: "If consciousness disappears for only a few seconds without the patient's falling down . . . one speaks of *absences* or *petit mal*, in contrast to the *grand mal*, or the pronounced attack."

For our purpose, a consideration of what is involved in *psychic epilepsy* is particularly to be desired. In such a form of the ailment, the attack proper may be replaced by any one of various possible equivalents. In their study entitled *Diseases of the Nervous System*, Jelliffe and White remark that attacks of this psychic epilepsy often take the form of what may be called epileptic automatism or epileptic dream-states. These same authors continue by pointing out that the patient who is under the influence of such conditions may do almost anything imaginable, and that later, after coming to himself again, he retains no memory whatsoever of what has occurred.

Among the various phenomena which are known to be associated with such psychic epilepsy are depressive states, periods of excitement, delirium, torpor, paranoid trends, etc.

It will be interesting to reflect briefly upon the character traits associated with epileptics. The epileptic gives us the impression of emotional immaturity. He is, as a rule, egocentric and hypersensitive, mani-

¹Bleuler, Eugen: *Textbook of Psychiatry*. Translated by A. A. Brill. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1924.

festing a sharp limitation of interests. According to McCurdy, moreover, epileptics are considerate but not really kind; religious but not really zealous. McCurdy tells us also that though they will work for praise, they will not do so for love.

Henderson and Gillespie, in their *Textbook of Psychiatry*, declare that in the final stages of epilepsy the individual leads an existence which is only vegetative, and which reminds one of some helpless infant, although exhibiting considerably less spontaneity. He needs to be clothed, fed, and cleaned by someone other than himself; he makes no apparent effort to exercise control over certain necessary functions. In addition, the individual in the final stages of epilepsy maintains a rigid silence and a quite vacuous expression of face.

Among the various epileptic phenomena mentioned previously, one speaks of *epileptic clouded states*. By this term we mean certain psychic reactions common to epileptics. During these so-called *clouded states* the epileptic may become profoundly confused or excited, manifesting considerable anxiety and bewilderment. Such pathologically coloured affects as violent outbreaks, hallucinations, fears, or rapturous moods with a religious character are associated with these states.

Apart from all else, epilepsy is known to have a very intimate connection with the sexual life—a connection which Krafft-Ebing was long ago astute

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enough to perceive. Krafft-Ebing¹ says: "Epilepsy is allied to the acquired states of mental weakness because it often leads to them, and then all the possibilities of reckless satisfaction of the sexual impulse that have been mentioned may occur. In many epileptics the sexual instinct is very intense. For the most part it is satisfied by masturbation, now and then by reckless attacks on children, and by pæderasty (*coitus per anum*). Perversion of the instinct with perverse sexual acts seems to be frequent."

During "free" intervals, epileptics give little evidence of an active sexual impulse, but show a very strong sexual impulse in connection with epileptic attacks or equivalents. Krafft-Ebing reports the case of a young man who, after a seizure, would invariably attack his mother and attempt to have sexual intercourse with her. After coming to himself, he would retain absolutely no recollection of such an act on his part. During the intervals he was morally strict, exhibiting little interest in sexual matters.

The following² is an illuminating case taken from Krafft-Ebing's collection:

X., of high social position, led a dissolute life for some time, and had epileptic attacks. He became en-

¹Krafft-Ebing, Richard von: *Psychopathia Sexualis*. Authorized translation. New York: Pioneer Publications, Inc., 1939.

²*Ibid.*

gaged. On his wedding day, shortly before the ceremony, he appeared on his brother's arm before the assembled guests. When he came before his bride, he exposed his genitals and began to masturbate. He was at once taken to an expert in mental diseases. On the way he constantly masturbated, and for some days was actuated by this impulse, which gradually decreased in intensity. After this paroxysm the patient had only a confused remembrance of the events, and could give no explanation of his acts.

This case shows clearly how the individual, after a paroxysm, either remembers nothing at all, or else has only the dimmest recollection of any acts he may have performed.

Freud has pointed out that the famous Russian novelist, Dostoyevsky, was an epileptic. It is a fact that in one of his novels the celebrated Russian has written a most graphic description of an epileptic attack made upon a little girl. Various other world-famous personages have been regarded as epileptics, though, as Bleuler believes, hardly on ample grounds.

CHAPTER XV

The Outlook

Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind.

—ROMANS XII:2

THERE CAN SCARCELY BE ANY DOUBT REGARDING the current interest of lay persons in matters which partake of a psychological character. Such an interest on the part of the laity is rendered evident not only by the success of a number of popular novels having psychological themes, but also by the success of such films as *Spellbound*, *Love Letters*, that splendid importation entitled *The Seventh Veil*, and others. From the graphic portrayals these films have given of such phenomena as amnesia, narcotic hypnosis, and the guilt complex, the layman probably has learned more about these matters than he would have learned in consequence of reading a psychiatric textbook. Who shall complain that this is not well enough? For such films almost invariably are characterized by a certain amount of scientific accuracy.

That the Second World War, which ended as I was in the midst of preparing this volume for the press, has helped to make a large number of people psychology-conscious, it would be difficult indeed to deny. And surely the veriest layman has a right to acquaint himself, should he so desire, with the principles of ab-

normal psychology, quite regardless of whether he possesses the knack of expressing himself always in just the appropriate terminology. I am without any wish to deny that I have encountered individuals who, without benefit of any purely formal knowledge, have yet evinced a really fine intuitive psychological understanding. Indeed, some of the world's foremost psychologists have been men whose sheer intuition has enabled them to perceive so many valuable truths about the human mind, even though it remains dubious whether they could have arrived, had they endeavoured to do so, at anything approaching a scientific formulation of their ideas. Is there one who can doubt that Christ Himself was a really great intuitive psychologist? Let us recall the tact and skill He employed in dealing with the various ailing types of humanity brought before Him; let us recall the confidence His very personality inspired in them. He never permitted His technique to become merely mechanical or stereotyped: He dealt with different individuals according to their different needs, their different symptoms. Shakespeare also may be mentioned as an overwhelmingly great intuitive psychologist. And what, one may ask, of such gifted beings as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche? We must not forget that at the time when Freud's career had its inception Schopenhauer had already perceived that psychosis might very well have its origin in the individual's

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effort to shut out some painful piece of reality. It is also well worth remembering that, while he was in the midst of some of his most important investigations, Freud sternly denied himself the pleasure of reading Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, because he felt that they had perceived intuitively some of the selfsame psychological truths which he himself was endeavouring to establish by means of scientific enquiry and experiment.

Without making any systematic attempt to trace the development of psychotherapy as we know it today, I must needs point out that the world owes a debt to Franz Anton Mesmer. It must be acknowledged that Mesmer, in evolving a technique of hypnotism, surely anticipated, if he did not actually inaugurate, the dawn of psychotherapy as we now know it. Owing to the energetic activities of Franz Anton Mesmer, as well as to the spectacular demonstrations which he staged in different places, hypnotism enjoyed a tremendous vogue during Mesmer's own lifetime, being then quite generally known as "Mesmerism." Later—apparently in consequence of prejudice and misunderstanding that existed in certain quarters—the method fell into disrepute, with some regarding it as an evil art or as a species of black magic. But we have evidence to show that a good many distinguished people who lived in those days believed themselves to have been very considerably benefited, if not ac-

tually cured of one ailment or another, through the application of hypnotic techniques. Miss Harriet Martineau, one of the most prolific English women-writers of the nineteenth century, published in 1845 her *Letters on Mesmerism*. These letters are illuminating and intensely interesting documents, as they contain a very lucid exposition of the purely subjective phenomena involved in hypnosis.

Although Mesmer appears to have been the first to evolve a specific technique of hypnotism, he himself possessed no scientific understanding of the hypnotic trance. Unable to arrive at an explanatory principle based upon psychological or physiological considerations, he attributed such a trance to the influence of certain heavenly bodies. It is to be much regretted, I think, that Mesmer should have died without realizing what his discovery was destined to contribute to the scientific understanding of various psychic phenomena.

One may say that hypnotism continued to be employed—at least as an adjuvant in the treatment of nervous and psychogenic disorders—until the time of Sigmund Freud, who ultimately discarded the method, chiefly because, according to him, not all persons in need of treatment were amenable to hypnosis. Until comparatively recent times, therefore, hypnotism simply reclined, in undeserved neglect, upon the dusty shelf to which outmoded techniques in psy-

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chotherapy are relegated. Today, thanks to such men as Hadfield in England and Wolberg in America, hypnotism has been removed from that dusty shelf and reinstated amongst active and reputable modes of therapy. It is now employed, in conjunction with psychoanalysis, in a goodly number of cases where the need for a more abbreviated method makes itself felt.

In reviewing the advances made in recent years in the field of psychotherapy, one must take into account also the method evolved some fifteen or sixteen years ago by J. Stephen Horsley, an Englishman. Horsley's method is known as *narcoanalysis*. In treating his patients for various forms of neurosis, he administers, very slowly, an intravenous injection of some suitable barbiturate—i.e., some such drug as nembutal or sodium amytal—which induces a state of artificial sleep. As the barbiturate is being administered, Horsley converses with his patients, giving them suggestions which have to do with rest and sleep, and endeavouring to establish rapport. Under the influence of such a drug, the patients talk more freely about themselves and their conflicts than they might otherwise do. This form of therapy, like hypnoanalysis, is often advantageously employed where the general circumstances do not favour the following of so lengthy a procedure as orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis.

Although this is not the place for a detailed descrip-

tion of the principles followed in either hypnoanalysis or narcoanalysis, I am confident that the general tone of my foregoing remarks will convey to the reader this impression: that psychotherapy is essentially a dynamic science; that it is constantly enlarging its scope as new discoveries are made, and more efficient methods devised. Not for one moment should we permit ourselves to lose sight of the fact that psychology itself is a comparative newcomer among rational sciences. Its future growth will depend in large measure upon man's intense desire for a deeper understanding of his own complicated psyche. Here I would remind the reader of some very wise words which appear elsewhere in this book: "The proper study of Mankind is Man."

Much has been learned; perhaps much remains to be learned. But the outlook itself, as I write these words in the early part of 1946, is at least propitious; and it well may be that we are now travelling on a road which will lead us ultimately to a really clear and sane understanding of the greatest of all enigmas:

MAN!

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A Note to the Reader: This bibliography does not aim at completeness. It is perhaps more in the nature of a suggested reading list for those interested in various aspects of abnormal psychology. Its purpose is to provide a bird's-eye view of certain important publications in this broad field. Perhaps some readers will have a specific rather than a general interest. Some, for instance, may feel disposed to enter more deeply into the phenomenological study of Freudian psychoanalysis; others, more deeply into that of Jungian psychology; still others, more deeply into that of sexology or hypnotism. Whoever happens to be motivated by a particular interest, whatever that interest may be, will do well, of course, to consult in detail the works of people who are known to have made outstanding contributions to the particular aspects of abnormal psychology to which he himself is thus drawn.

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